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THE BAKALY DEBACLE: THE ROLE OF THE PRESS IN HIGH-
PROFILE CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS
JULIE R. O'SuLLIvAN*
INTRODUCTION
When I was invited to discuss the likely legal fallout of the Clinton
"scandals," I was hard pressed to isolate a theme that other authors
participating in this Symposium had not already explored or would
not now effectively address. I wish, then, to take a slight detour, in
hopes that it will be both a worthwhile one for debate and ultimately
pertinent to the legacy of the independent counsel statute and the
Clinton "scandals." My subject concerns the case of Charles G. Bakaly,
III, former spokesperson for Independent Counsel Kenneth Starr.
Mr. Bakaly was tried in the U.S. District Court for the District of Co-
lumbia on charges of criminal contempt. The case is founded on
allegations that Mr. Bakaly, in certain court filings made on behalf of
the Office of the Independent Counsel (OIC), lied when he denied
leaking information to a reporter for the New York Times, Don Van
NattaJr.2 As of this writing, the case has not been resolved,' but even
© CopyrightJulie R. O'Sullivan and Maryland Law Review, Inc. 2001.
* John Carroll Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. A.B., Stanford
University; J.D., Cornell University. Former Associate Counsel in the Whitewater Investiga-
tion (Jan. 1994-Oct. 1994) under regulatory Independent Counsel Robert B. Fiske, Jr., and
statutory Independent Counsel Kenneth Starr. I should note that illustrative cites through-
out this piece are generally to the Washington Post for the simple reason that I read it every
day; I am fervently hoping that the views expressed herein will not cause a cancellation of
my subscription. I would like to thank my patient and diligent research assistants, Margaret
Whitney and Chad Pimental, for their help in the preparation of this Article. I would also
like to thank Benjamin Wittes who (in his strictly personal and not professional capacity)
provided me thoughtful comments and posed the question addressed at the very end of
this Article, thus inspiring me to think and write about this topic in the first instance.
Thanks, too, to the other reporters who (again acting as individuals and not as representa-
tives of news organizations) reviewed and offered invaluable comments on drafts of this
piece.
1. See In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 117 F. Supp. 2d 6, 8 (D.D.C. 2000). Mr. Bakaly
was charged pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 401(1) (1994), which states that "[a] court of the
United States shall have the power to punish by fine or imprisonment, at its discretion,
such contempt of its authority, and none other, as... [m]isbehavior of any person in its
presence or so near thereto as to obstruct the administration ofjustice."
2. See In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 117 F. Supp. 2d at 8-16 (detailing the facts sur-
rounding the charges brought against Mr. Bakaly).
3. Eds.-After this Article was submitted for publication, but before the editorial pro-
cess was completed, the district court acquitted Mr. Bakaly of all charges. See id. at 8.
Because it was too late in the process to perform substantive revisions, and because the
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at this point it is interesting to touch upon the questions it raises
about the interaction between actors in the criminal process and the
press in a scandal-driven environment.
Others have examined why prosecutors or law enforcement
agents may be inclined to "leak" information regarding ongoing crim-
inal investigations, documented the rules that govern federal prosecu-
tors' interaction with the press in such circumstances, outlined the
difficulties encountered in enforcing those rules, and critiqued the
performance of Mr. Starr's office in this regard.4 In other words, the
dynamic as it flows from governmental actors to the press has been
scrutinized. I would like to suggest that a more searching examina-
tion be conducted of the press's role, and perhaps its responsibilities,
in this context. Because I am neither a journalist nor a First Amend-
ment scholar (and have committed to an article, not a book), I do not
undertake exhaustively to cover this topic, or even to answer many of
the questions I raise. I write in hopes that others will find the perspec-
tive of a criminal lawyer interesting in the ongoing debate regarding
the place of the press in the Lewinsky affair and in high-profile or
scandal-driven criminal investigations generally.5
court's decision does not affect most of the discussion in this piece, that decision is not
reflected in the body of this Article. Some footnotes have been altered to reflect the
court's findings, and others have been added to document the court's holdings on the
substantive counts discussed. The court also made one observation regarding the sourcing
of the New York Times article at issue, which is quoted infra note 170.
4. See, e.g., John Q. Barrett, The Leak and the Craft: A Hard Line Proposal to Stop Unac-
countable Disclosures of Law Enforcement Information, 68 FoRDHAM L. REv. 613 (1999); Daniel
C. Richman, Grand Jury Secrecy: Plugging the Leaks in an Empty Bucket, 36 AM. CIuM. L. REv.
339 (1999); Ronald D. Rotunda, Independent Counsel and the Charges of Leaking: A Brief Case
Study, 68 FoRDHAm L. REv. 869 (1999). For a general discussion of the defense's increasing
reliance on public relations strategies, and the ethical implications of such strategies, see
Jonathan M. Moses, Note, Legal Spin Control: Ethics and Advocacy in the Court of Public Opin-
ion, 95 COLUM. L. REv. 1811 (1995).
5. Because I discuss journalistic sourcing at some length, I should perhaps address my
own choices of sources. I have relied throughout on perspectives offered by press com-
mentators and editorial writers. I am cautioned by one highly respected reporter who
reviewed an earlier draft that equating editorial comments by news organizations with the
attitudes of reporters and editors may be misleading. It has been suggested to me that
news management and editorial writers are viewed by many reporters as part of a commu-
nity establishment from which they are proudly divorced. My reliance on these sources
stems from their relevance, my own lack of experience, and the fact that most reporters
seem to lack the time and the inclination for "hand-wringing" about issues such as those
raised within. To the extent that I was able to divine from beat reporters their attitudes
about some of the issues raised, however, I have tried to reflect them within.
I should also note that, from what I am told, some reporters would view my entire
enterprise in this Article as something of a fool's errand. I am assured that many journal-
ists would say that they do not get the news out to win popularity contests or even public
approval. Good reporters feel no obligation to help make governmental processes work;
they are not, in practicing their craft, looking for good citizenship awards. They attempt to
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I. THE BAKALY CASE
A. Background
On January 31, 1999, the New York Times published a front-page
story authored by Don Van Natta Jr. and entitled "Starr Is Weighing
Whether to Indict Sitting President."6 The lead for the story read:
"The independent counsel, Kenneth W. Starr, has concluded that he
has the constitutional authority to seek a grand jury indictment of
President Clinton before he leaves the White House in January 2001,
several associates of Mr. Starr said this week."7 The article then went
on to report on discussions allegedly occurring within the OIC con-
cerning the options open to that office,8 which were said to be to de-
cline a criminal prosecution against the President; to indict, but
postpone the trial; to indict the President under seal; or to indict after
the President leaves office.9 The article constantly cited as the source
of its information "several associates of Mr. Starr," and explicitly
stated: "Charles G. Bakaly 3d, the spokesman for Mr. Starr, declined
to discuss the matter. 'We will not discuss the plans of this office or
the plans of the grand jury in any way, shape or form,' he said."' °
The day after the article appeared, the President and the White
House filed a motion seeking an Order to Show Cause why the OIC,
or individuals in that office, should not be held in contempt for violat-
ing Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e)," which requires attor-
neys for the government to maintain the secrecy of "matters occurring
be accurate and honest in recounting the facts and in their sourcing not because they
worry about the effects that their reports will have on sources, the functioning of the crimi-
nal justice system, or the government, but rather because of their professional pride in
their vocation. If reporting the news is done well, it may well have consequences, some of
which may be adverse to individuals or institutions. But, I am told, many journalists believe
that as long as they have done their job, the unintended consequences are someone else's
problem.
This is a perspective that is profoundly foreign to me as an academic and lawyer (that
is, a professional hand-wringer). It may well be, then, that the only members of the fourth
estate interested in my comments will be press commentators, editorial writers, press man-
agement, and the odd reporter here and there-an audience I would be happy to have. I
hope, however, that just as I have found challenging and interesting the profoundly differ-
ent perspectives of the journalists with whom I have conversed while writing this piece,
journalists will find my comments worthy of at least some reflection.
6. Don Van Natta Jr., The President's Trial: The Independent Counsel; Start Is Weighing
Whether to Indict Sitting President, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31, 1999, §1, at 1.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. See In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 117 F. Supp. 2d 6, 8 (D.D.C. 2000).
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before the grand jury."12 In addition to the lead sentence quoted
above, the President and the White House identified the following
portions of the Times story as containing information divulged by the
OIC in violation of Rule 6(e):
- "While the President's legal team has fought in the Senate
chamber for the President's political survival, Mr. Starr and
his prosecutors have actively considered whether to ask a
Federal grand jury here to indict Mr. Clinton before his term
expires, said Mr. Starr's associates, who spoke on the condi-
tion of anonymity."
- "Inside the Independent Counsel's Office, a group of
prosecutors believes that not long after the Senate trial con-
cludes, Mr. Starr should ask the grand jury of 23 men and
women hearing the case against Mr. Clinton to indict him on
charges of perjury and obstruction of justice, the associates
said. The group wants to charge Mr. Clinton with lying
under oath in hisJones deposition inJanuary 1998 and in his
grand jury testimony in August, the associates added."
- "Since early last year, the constitutional question has been
exhaustively researched by two constitutional law experts
who are paid consultants to Mr. Starr: Ronald D. Rotunda of
the University of Illinois Law School and William Kelley of
the University of Notre Dame. Both Mr. Rotunda and Mr.
Kelley have concluded that the 1997 Supreme Court deci-
sion in the Paula Jones case suggests that the Constitution
does not prohibit a prosecutor from seeking an indictment,
trial and conviction of a sitting President, the associates
said."1
The OIC hired outside counsel, Donald Bucklin, to represent it
in the Order to Show Cause litigation and asked the FBI to investigate
the alleged Rule 6(e) violation. 4 To respond to the Order to Show
Cause motion, Mr. Bucklin and an associate met on several occasions
with Mr. Bakaly."5 Mr. Bakaly had served as Counselor to Mr. Starr
since April 13, 1998, and in that capacity his responsibilities included
"'addressing strategic and public policy issues, and communication of
the work of the [OIC] to the general public."" 6 He also served as
12. FED. R. CiuM. P. 6(e)(2).
13. In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 117 F. Supp. 2d at 9 (quoting Van Natta, supra note 6,
at 1).
14. See id
15. Id. at 10.
16. Id. (quoting Declaration of Charles G. Bakaly, III, 1, In re Grand Jury Proceed-
ings, 117 F. Supp. 2d 6 (D.D.C. 2000) [hereinafter Bakaly Declaration]).
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"'the OIC's spokesman and contact person with the news media."" 7
The attorneys prepared a declaration for Mr. Bakaly, which he then
reviewed and amended. 8 On February 9, 1999, Mr. Bakaly swore to
and signed the declaration.' 9 It was filed with the court in support of
the OIC's Memorandum in Opposition to the Motion for an Order to
Show Cause (Opposition Brief).20 The Opposition Brief made two ar-
guments. First, the OIC contended that the Times article did not dis-
close "matters occurring before the grand jury."'" Second, the OIC
argued that it was "not the source of the disclosures complained of by
movants."22 The OIC cited Mr. Bakaly's declaration in arguing that
the disclosures complained of by the White House and the President
did not originate with persons inside the OIC.2"
Throughout February 1999, the OIC's internal investigation con-
tinued.2 4 During this period, Mr. Bakaly met with various OIC attor-
neys, counsel for the OIC, and FBI agents to discuss his conversations
with Mr. Van Natta.2 5 On March 8, 1999, the OIC filed an amend-
ment to its Opposition Brief, withdrawing the Bakaly Declaration and
the portion of the Opposition Brief that stated that the OIC was "not
the source of the disclosures in [the Times] article."2 6 The asserted
basis for the amendment was that:
[r] ecently, the FBI informed undersigned counsel that Mr.
Bakaly had acknowledged to its investigators that he pro-
vided Mr. Van Natta some of the information reported in the
New York Times article or confirmed the accuracy of informa-
tion that Mr. Van Natta already possessed and attributed to
sources outside the OIC.27
17. Id. (quoting Bakaly Declaration, supra note 16, 1).
18. Id.; see also Charles G. Bakaly, III's Pre-Trial Brief at 5-13, In re Grand Jury Proceed-
ings, 117 F. Supp. 2d 6 (D.D.C. 2000) [hereinafter Bakaly's Pre-Trial Brief] (detailing Mr.
Bakaly's interaction with counsel and alterations made to his declaration).
19. In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 117 F. Supp. 2d at 10.
20. Id.; see Opposition of the United States of America to the Motion for Order to Show
Cause, In re GrandJury Proceedings, 117 F. Supp. 2d 6 (D.D.C. 2000) [hereinafter Opposi-
tion Brief].
21. In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 117 F. Supp. 2d at 12.
22. Id.
23. See id.
24. See id. at 11.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 12 (citing Amendment to the Opposition of the OIC to the Motion for Order
to Show Cause and Withdrawal of Argument and Supporting Declaration at 1-2, In re
Grand Jury Proceedings, 117 F. Supp. 2d 6 (D.D.C. 2000) [hereinafter Amendment to
Opposition Brief]).
27. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Amendment to Opposition Brief, supra note
26, at 1-2).
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The amendment also informed the court that the OIC had referred
the matter to the Department of Justice (DOJ).28
On March 25, 1999, the district court issued an Order to Show
Cause why the OIC should not be held in contempt for violating Rule
6(e), finding that one passage in the Times article did disclose matters
occurring before the grandjury.2 9 The court further ordered that Mr.
Bakaly "'appear at a hearing to address the serious allegation that he
filed a materially false declaration intended to mislead this Court and
to show cause why he should not be held in contempt for his con-
duct." 3 At the request of the DOJ, the Order to Show Cause was
stayed pending the DOJ's investigation. 1
On July 13, 1999, the DOJ notified the court that it would not
prosecute Mr. Bakaly and suggested that "'the alleged misconduct
committed by Mr. Bakaly can best be addressed and remedied
through the contempt proceedings already initiated by the Court.' "32
The DOJ further suggested that:
"in light of the nature of the allegations against Mr. Bakaly
and the sanctions that would likely be imposed upon him if
he were found guilty by the Court,... Mr. Bakaly should be
provided the procedural protections of the criminal law...
and the contempt proceedings therefore should be consid-
ered criminal rather than civil in nature."
33
The DOJ also "advised the Court that ajury trial was not required
because, should Mr. Bakaly be found guilty, DOJ would not recom-
mend a term of imprisonment in excess of six months. ' 34 On July 14,
28. Id. (quoting Amendment to Opposition Brief, supra note 26, at 1-2).
29. Id. at 12 (citing Order to Show Cause at 5-6, In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 117 F.
Supp. 2d 6 (D.D.C. 2000) [hereinafter Order to Show Cause]). The one passage was:
"Inside the Independent Counsel's Office, a group of prosecutors believes that
not long after the Senate trial concludes, Mr. Starr should ask the grand jury of 23
men and women hearing the case against Mr. Clinton to indict him on charges of
perjury and obstruction ofjustice, the associates said. The group wants to charge
Mr. Clinton with lying under oath in his Jones deposition in January 1998 and in
his grand jury testimony in August, the associates added."
Id. (quoting Order to Show Cause, supra, at 5-6, quoting in turn Van Natta, supra note 6, at
1).
30. Id. at 13 (quoting Order to Show Cause, supra note 29, at 3).
31. Id.
32. Id. (quoting Letter from Michael Horowitz, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, to
the Honorable Norma Holloway Johnson, Chief Judge, United States District Court, Dis-
trict of Columbia 1 (July 13, 1999) [hereinafter Letter from Michael Horowitz]).
33. Id. (second alteration in original) (quoting Letter from Michael Horowitz, supra
note 32, at 1).
34. Id. (citing Letter from Michael Horowitz, supra note 32, at 1, citing in turn Cheffv.
Schnackenberg, 384 U.S. 373, 378 (1966)).
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1999, the district court lifted its stay of the contempt proceedings and
adopted the DOJ's recommendations.3 5 The court announced that
the contempt proceedings would be criminal in nature and that the
DOJ would be appointed to prosecute the contempt charges against
Mr. Bakaly and the OIC.36
The OIC appealed the court's March 25 and July 14 orders.
37
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Cir-
cuit reversed as to the OIC, holding that the one passage in the Times
article cited by the district court as the foundation for its Order to
Show Cause against the OIC3 s was in fact "not Rule 6(e) material."3 9
In short, none of the information contained in the article that was as-
serted to constitute grand jury material covered by Rule 6(e) was
found to be subject to the secrecy requirements of that rule.40
Nonetheless, the contempt case against Mr. Bakaly alone then
proceeded on the basis of the Government's Amended Notice of Es-
sential Facts Constituting Criminal Contempt, filed pursuant to Fed-
eral Rule of Criminal Procedure 42 (b) .41 The case was tried without a
jury before Chief Judge Norma Holloway Johnson, and, as of this writ-
ing, the Judge has yet to issue an opinion.4 2 In discussing the sub-
stance of the case, then, I will rely on the submissions of the parties.
In particular, I will largely accept as true the factual assertions of the
Government, although not the inferences and conclusions it draws
from those facts. My purpose in accepting the Goverment's statement
of facts is to demonstrate why I believe that, even assuming the worst
35. Id. at 14 (citing Order of July 14, 1999, at 2, In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 117 F.
Supp. 2d 6 (D.D.C. 2000) [hereinafter Order of July 14]).
36. Id. (citing Order of July 14, supra note 35, at 2).
37. Id.
38. See supra note 29 (quoting the passage in the New York Times article, the disclosure
of which the district court found to have violated Rule 6(e)).
39. In re Sealed Case No. 99-3091, 192 F.3d 995, 1003 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
40. See id. at 1001-05 (discussing why disclosure of the material contained in the Times
article did not constitute a violation of Rule 6(e)).
41. In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 117 F. Supp. 2d at 14. On November 29, 1999, the
DOJ issued its Notice, pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 42(b) (providing
for disposition of criminal contempt upon notice and hearing). In re GrandJury Proceed-
ings, Misc. No. 99-38, at 13 (D.D.C. July 12, 2000) (mem.) (citing Government's Notice of
Essential Facts Constituting Criminal Contempt, In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 117 F. Supp.
2d 6 (D.D.C. 2000) [hereinafter Government's Notice of Essential Facts]). On June 23,
2000, the Government filed an Amended Notice of Essential Facts Constituting Criminal
Contempt, also pursuant to Rule 42(b), specifying particular falsehoods alleged to be ob-
structive. In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 117 F. Supp. 2d at 14 (citing Amended Notice of
Essential Facts Constituting Criminal Contempt 12-14, In re Grand Jury Proceedings,
117 F. Supp. 2d 6 (D.D.C. 2000) [hereinafter Amended Notice]).
42. See supra note 3.
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case for the defense, this was a matter that in a less highly charged
context probably would not have been pursued.
It appears clear, at least from the Government's papers, that Mr.
Bakaly spoke extensively with Mr. Van Natta and provided him with
information and confirmation of information that appeared in the
Times article.4" In a statement signed by Mr. Bakaly, he explained that
he "aggressively sought to direct the article in a way that would protect
the office against future attacks and 'set the stage' for our future work
including the possible criminal prosecution of the President regard-
less of the outcome of the Senate impeachment trial."4 4 Although
both sides agree that Mr. Bakaly admitted to the OIC (and derivatively
to the court) certain of the help he had provided Mr. Van Natta, the
Government's submission also indicates that Mr. Bakaly did not ini-
tially disclose to the OIC or its counsel all of the assistance he had
rendered.45 Whether this was due to an initial failure of recollection,
a mistaken belief that the OIC and its counsel wished to know only
whether he provided grand jury material to Mr. Van Natta, or a desire
to deceive them as to his role is far less clear.
As the discussion that follows this case summary evidences, I
have-to put it mildly-serious reservations about the wisdom and
propriety of any prosecutor's office engaging in these types of off-the-
record, "spinning" conversations with reporters. I certainly do not
condone lying to any court in any form or for any reason. The ques-
tion I examine here, however, is not whether Mr. Bakaly should have
been talking to Mr. Van Natta. And it is not, for present purposes,
whether he could or should have been more forthcoming. It is
whether Mr. Bakaly deserves criminal sanction on the basis of the al-
legedly false and misleading statements charged by the Government.
B. The Charges Against Mr. Bakaly
In successive rounds of briefing, the parties have engaged in care-
ful and detailed discussion of the charges brought and the evidence
presented at trial. Recounting their analyses would unduly tax read-
43. See Government's Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 1 8-52, at 3-
15, In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 117 F. Supp. 2d 6 (D.D.C. 2000) [hereinafter Govern-
ment's Proposed Findings of Fact] (describing Mr. Bakaly's statements recounting the
information he provided or confirmed to Mr. Van Natta).
44. Government's Exhibit 14, 4, at 3, In re GrandJury Proceedings, 117 F. Supp. 2d 6
(D.D.C. 2000) [hereinafter Government's Exhibit 14] (quoted in Government's Proposed
Findings of Fact, supra note 43, at 14).
45. See Government's Proposed Findings of Fact, supra note 43, 8-52, at 3-15 (dis-
cussing Mr. Bakaly's initial disclosures in his Declaration and his subsequent disclosures to
OIC and FBI investigators).
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ers' patience. I therefore will attempt to summarize the basic issues, I
hope without doing too much violence to the subtleties of the case. It
is my belief that the case ultimately revolves around two sets of
charges.4 6
First, the Government charged that Mr. Bakaly lied in making the
following underscored statement in his declaration:
4 7
During a conversation with Mr. Van Natta on either January
28 or 30, 1999, it became apparent that he was going to pro-
ceed with the article. I expressed my concerns over how he
intended to source the information that he had described to
me as coming from outside the OIC. I feared that informa-
tion about the purported views of Judge Starr and some
group within the OIC would be perceived as originating
from within the Office. Mr. Van Natta again assured me that
his sources were outside the OIC, that he was "working on
his sourcing" and that he intended to make it clear in his
article that his sources were not within the OIC. I also ex-
pressed concern over the timing of his article-during the
Senate impeachment trial-and that the OIC would once
46. The Government brought four counts against Mr. Bakaly. See In re Grand Jury Pro-
ceedings, 117 F. Supp. 2d at 14-16 (quoting Amended Notice, supra note 41, 11 12-14).
The charge discussed first (above) relates to one count set forth in Amended Notice I
12(c). See In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 117 F. Supp. 2d at 15-16 (quoting the relevant
charge). The charges discussed second (above) relate to two counts set forth in Amended
Notice 11 12(a) and 12(b). SeeIn re GrandJury Proceedings, 117 F. Supp. 2d at 15 (quot-
ing the relevant charges). Finally, the Government alleged in Amended Notice 1 13 that:
Mr. Bakaly's knowing misrepresentations and knowing failure to inform [OIC
counsel] and OIC personnel about his contacts with Van Natta caused the follow-
ing materially false and misleading statement to appear on page 13 of the OIC's
Opposition Brief: "Mr. Van Natta further told Mr. Bakaly that all his information
came from sources 'outside' the OIC."
Government's Proposed Findings of Fact, supra note 43, 1 67, at 26 (quoting Opposition
Brief, supra note 20, at 13, and discussing Amended Notice, supra note 41, 1 13). Defense
counsel argue that "Mr. Bakaly was not involved in the preparation of the OIC brief in
opposition to the motion for an order to show cause, and did not see the brief, or any draft
of the brief, prior to the brief being filed with the Court." Bakaly's Pre-Trial Brief, supra
note 18, at 13. I see nothing in the Government's Proposed Findings of Fact to gainsay this
statement. Instead, the Government argues that it was "fully foreseeable" that the OIC
would rely on Mr. Bakaly's declaration in preparing its brief, and thus he should be charge-
able with this allegedly false statement. Government's Proposed Findings of Fact, supra
note 43, 67, at 27. My own view is that the causal nexus here is very attenuated and that,
absent other strong counts, a declarant should not be criminally pursued for the overstate-
ments made by counsel over which he had no control. Further, this count rises and, I
submit, falls on the disposition of the other substantive charges. Accordingly, I do not
treat this count in text.
47. See In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 117 F. Supp. 2d at 15-16 ("'At the time that Mr.
Bakaly made the.., underlined statement and representation he knew that it was false and
misleading .... .'" (quoting Amended Notice, supra note 41, 12(c))).
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again be unfairly criticized for interfering in the Senate's
business. Mr. Van Natta said that he had not thought of that
as an issue.48
It is worth noting (for purposes of later discussion) that the Gov-
ernment did not force Mr. Van Natta to testify regarding the truth of
this passage. Thus, there was no direct evidence introduced that Mr.
Van Natta did not say that which Mr. Bakaly attributed to him in the
underscored sentence. The Government argued, however, that the
underscored statement "conveys, and was intended to convey, the im-
pression that Mr. Bakaly simply was not one of the unnamed 'associ-
ates' of Mr. Starr in the article," an impression the Government
contends was false.49
Perhaps this is the impression left by a quick read, but it is cer-
tainly not the most natural reading of the statement in context. Fairly
read, the assertion that Mr. Van Natta's sources were "outside the
OIC" refers only to the sources of the information in the two
sentences that precede the underscored portion of Mr. Bakaly's decla-
ration. Mr. Bakaly in fact amended a draft of this paragraph, pre-
pared by OIC counsel to make clear that the information he was
referring to was limited to the specific information that Mr. Van Natta
had described to Mr. Bakaly as coming from outside the OIC-that is,
that Mr. Starr had recently concluded that he had the authority to
indict a sitting president and that a group of OIC prosecutors favored
indictment.5 ° Indeed, the person who drafted the sentence-the
OIC's attorney, Mr. Bucklin-testified that this limited interpretation
of the amended sentence was intended.51 Because it appears uncon-
tested that Mr. Van Natta did indeed have at least one other source
telling him about the purported views of Mr. Starr and some group of
prosecutors within the OIC, there is no evidence to suggest that Mr.
Bakaly's characterization of Mr. Van Natta's assurances was false. 2
48. Bakaly Declaration, supra note 16, 11, at 3-4 (underscore added).
49. Government's Proposed Findings of Fact, supra note 43, 66, at 25. The Govern-
ment further stated that "the entire thrust of Mr. Bakaly's declaration was to convince the
Court that he provided no information to Mr. Van Natta other than the specific items
disclosed in the declaration." Id.
50. See Charles G. Bakaly, III's Post-Trial Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law 90, at 33, In re GrandJury Proceedings, 117 F. Supp. 2d 6 (D.D.C. 2000) [hereinafter
Bakaly's Proposed Findings of Fact] (setting forth the amended version of this paragraph).
51. Id. 92, at 34.
52. Eds.-The district court found that "[i]t is overly broad to read the statement in
Mr. Bakaly's declaration as denying that he was the source at all for Mr. Van Natta.... [A]
fair reading of this statement limits it to 'information about the purported views ofJudge
Starr and some group within the OIC.'" In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 117 F. Supp. 2d at
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Second, the Government charged that Mr. Bakaly lied in telling
the court in his declaration that he had not discussed "non-public"
matters with Mr. Van Natta,55 and that he similarly lied when he stated
that he "refused to confirm or comment on what Judge Starr or the
OIC was thinking or doing."5 4
The Government relied on a number of alleged communications
to prove these charges: (1) Mr. Bakaly confirmed to Mr. Van Natta the
four options considered by the OIC regarding the possible indictment
of President Clinton; (2) Mr. Bakaly told Mr. Van Natta that a perjury
count based on the President's deposition in the Jones lawsuit was a
stronger case than the perjury count being tried in the Senate; (3) Mr.
Bakaly told Mr. Van Natta, when discussing the persons Mr. Bakaly
believed to be the sources of Mr. Van Natta's information, that Profes-
sor Rotunda was not in the office much and that Mr. Udolf left the
0IC in April or May 1998, and may be biased against the OIC; (4) Mr.
Bakaly told Mr. Van Natta that Mr. Starr relies quite a bit on the ad-
32 (quoting Bakaly Declaration, supra note 16, 11). The court held that this statement
was not proved false beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.
53. In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 117 F. Supp. 2d at 15 (quoting Amended Notice,
supra note 41, 11 12(a), 12(b), at 5-6). The Government alleged in Amended Notice
12(a) that Mr. Bakaly lied in making the following underscored statement:
"I next recall a conversation with Mr. Van Natta on this subject on or aboutJanu-
ary 21, 1999. This occurred just a few days after an article byJill Abramson ap-
peared in the New York Times. Ms. Abramson's article addressed possible trials of
the President and others after the conclusion of the Senate impeachment pro-
ceeding.... Consistent with the position I took with Mr. Van Natta, I declined to
discuss non-public matters with Ms. Abramson, and her article states: 'Charles G.
Bakaly, 3d, a spokesman for the Independent Counsel's Office, would not com-
ment on any indictment speculation .... '"
Id. 12(a) (underscore added) (quoting Bakaly Declaration, supra note 16, 1 6, at 2, quot-
ing in turn Jill Abramson, Ideas & Trends: No Exit; The Trial May End, But the Trials Will Go
On, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17, 1999, § 4, at 1). The central question with respect to this count is
whether Mr. Bakaly did in fact discuss "non-public" matters with Mr. Van Natta.
54. In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 117 F. Supp. 2d at 15 (quoting Amended Notice,
supra note 41, 12(b), quoting in turn Bakaly Declaration, supra note 16, 8, at 3). The
Government alleged in Amended Notice 12(b) that Mr. Bakaly knowingly made the un-
derscored false and misleading statement in his declaration:
"I cautioned Mr. Van Natta that he should not rely on information from outside
sources purporting to know what was going on inside the OIC. I noted that peo-
ple often overstate their knowledge as well as their own importance. In an effort
to steer Mr. Van Natta away from an inaccurate report, I suggested that Judge
Starr was himself a constitutional scholar and would not be swayed by any one
person or recent event. I refused to confirm or comment on what Judge Starr or
the OIC was thinking or doing. I agreed to provide an on-the-record quote,
which appeared in Mr. Van Natta's article: 'We will not discuss the plans of this
office or the plans of the grand jury in any way, shape or form.'"
Id. (underscore added) (quoting Bakaly Declaration, supra note 16, 8, quoting in turn
Van Natta, supra note 6, at 1).
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vice of Professor Kelley; and (5) Mr. Bakaly confirmed that the OIC
was doing research at the National Archives." Specifically, the Gov-
ernment asserted that matters (1)-(5) were, in fact, "non-public" and
that matters (1), (2), and (5) demonstrated that Mr. Bakaly informed
Mr. Van Natta about what the OIC was "thinking and doing."56
To some extent the resolution of this case depends upon two def-
initional questions: (1) whether the assertion that Mr. Bakaly "refused
to confirm or comment on what Judge Starr or the OIC was thinking
or doing" 7 relates (as the defense would have it) specifically to the
OIC's internal deliberations regarding a possible indictment, 58 or
whether (as the Government claims) it relates generally to anything
that was going on in the office;59 and (2) what constitutes "non-pub-
lic" information.'
It is worth remembering that the Government bears a heavy bur-
den in criminal prosecutions. In light of this burden, the defense has
the better position on the first question. In the context of the entire
declaration, the most natural meaning of Mr. Bakaly's statement is
that he declined to discuss Mr. Starr's or the office's deliberations re-
garding a possible indictment.
With respect to the second question, concerning the definition of
"non-public" matters, the defense asserts that the Government did not
present evidence demonstrating a commonly understood definition
of that term.61 The defense further notes that it is uncontested that
none of the matters itemized above were covered by Rule 6(e)'s se-
55. Government's Proposed Findings of Fact, supra note 43, 1 64, at 19-23.
56. See id. (discussing the Government's allegations concerning these five communica-
tions). To prove the charge in Amended Notice 12(b), which alleges that Mr. Bakaly
falsely stated that he "refused to confirm or comment on whatJudge Starr or the OIC was
thinking or doing," Bakaly Declaration, supra note 16, 1 8, at 3, the Government also relied
on a further assertion that Mr. Bakaly did confirm or comment on what was going on in
the OIC when he "discussed 'internal matters' with Mr. Van Natta in an attempt to influ-
ence Van Natta to write an article that would protect the OIC and set the stage for its
future work." Government's Proposed Findings of Fact, supra note 43, 1 65(b), at 23. I do
not treat this allegation in the text because it rests entirely on one agent's testimony that
Mr. Bakaly admitted in an interview that "he had discussed internal OIC matters with Mr.
Van Natta." Id. Mr. Bakaly denies that he made this statement. Id. Due to the Govern-
ment's apparent failure to elicit specifics about these matters from the agent at trial, it is
difficult to evaluate this assertion.
57. Bakaly Declaration, supra note 16, 8, at 3.
58. See Bakaly's Proposed Findings of Fact, supra note 50, 1 63, at 26.
59. See Government's Proposed Findings of Fact, supra note 43, 65, at 23-24.
60. See Bakaly's Proposed Findings of Fact, supra note 50, 11 21-59, at 12-23 (discussing
the disputed conversations and arguing that Mr. Bakaly did not disclose "non-public" infor-
mation); Government's Proposed Findings of Fact, supra note 43, 764, at 19-23 (discussing
these conversations and characterizing the information disclosed as "non-public").
61. See Bakaly's Proposed Findings of Fact, supra note 50, 1 23, at 13.
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crecy requirement.6 2 Mr. Bakaly argues that his understanding of
"non-public" matters was matters covered by Rule 6(e); thus, by defini-
tion, in his mind, nothing he discussed was "non-public."6
The Government believes that this is an after-the-fact rationaliza-
tion and was not Mr. Bakaly's contemporaneous belief. It argues that
this position is inconsistent with the reasonable inferences to be
drawn from the chronology of what Mr. Bakaly did and said.6 4 In cast-
ing about for some standard by which to judge what is "non-public,"
the Government relies on the OIC's concession in the Rule 6(e) litiga-
tion that the information disclosed in the Times article was confiden-
tial and non-public in nature.6 5 There are at least two difficulties with
this approach. First, it is questionable whether Mr. Bakaly should be
bound by counsel's statements in the OIC's filings in the original Or-
der to Show Cause litigation. Second, and more fundamental, only
two of the above-described communications-the first and the fifth-
even appeared in the Times article.6 6 Thus, even if the OIC took the
position that the matters discussed in the article were confidential,
most of the Government's asserted bases for a finding that Mr. Bakaly
shared "non-public" information would not be covered by that
concession.
Given the Government's burden, it seems to me that if there is
any arguable basis for a finding that the five items specified above
were in the public domain, the Government's case should fail. With
this perspective, were the five pieces of information relied upon by the
Government "non-public" matters that illuminated in material ways
the inside workings of the OIC?
1. Mr. Bakaly Confirmed to Mr. Van Natta the Four Options Consid-
ered by the OIC Regarding the Possible Indictment of President Clinton.-This
is by far the most material of the allegations lodged by the Govern-
ment because the fact that the four options were under consideration
was apparently that which earned the article its notoriety (even if it
was questionable whether this was actually "news"). The four options
available to the OIC were reported to be to decline, to indict and de-
62. See Bakaly's Pre-Trial Brief, supra note 18, at 3 ("The motion to show cause based
on asserted Rule 6(e) violations that was filed by the White House .. .- which detailed a
number of specific portions of the article that contained Rule 6(e) material--did not men-
tion even one of the items contained in any of these five statements.").
63. See id. at 4.
64. See Government's Proposed Findings of Fact, supra note 43, 64(a), at 20.
65. See id. 64, at 19 (citing Opposition Brief, supra note 20, at 2).
66. See Van Natta, supra note 6, at 1 (reporting the OIC's four indictment options and
noting that the office was conducting research at the National Archives).
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fer trial, to indict under seal, and to await the end of the President's
term to indict.6 7 Mr. Bakaly informed OIC counsel that Mr. Van Natta
had told Mr. Bakaly that he knew about the four options and knew
that there had been an OIC meeting at which those options were put
on the blackboard by one of the prosecutors and another OIC attor-
ney.6" The Government seems to accept this statement as true.6 9 In
other words, there was a source for this information other than Mr.
Bakaly. Mr. Bakaly admits that he "'confirmed that these were
prosecutive options available to the independent counsel.' ,70 The
heart of the dispute between the parties lies in whether Mr. Bakaly did
more than confirm that these options existed, and, in fact, essentially
confirmed that they were being actively discussed by the OIC.71
It is true, as Mr. Bakaly's counsel argues, that conceding that the
OIC had these four options states a truism to anyone with any familiar-
ity with criminal law.72 I would go further and contend that the fact
that Mr. Starr was actively considering these options should not have
been "news" and should not have been considered a "non-public"
matter. One could reasonably conclude, in fact, that Mr. Starr would
not be doing his job if he failed to have this debate in light of the facts
that his mandate was to determine whether a criminal case should be
pursued based on the conduct discovered, that he had extensively
used the coercive powers of the criminal law (grand jury, immunity,
etc.) to investigate the case, and that he had written a report arguing
67. Id.
68. Government's Proposed Findings of Fact, supra note 43, 64(a), at 19.
69. See id. (arguing that Mr. Bakaly's statement to OIC attorneys is part of the clear
evidence that Mr. Bakaly confirmed the "four options"). One wonders why we do not yet
know the identity of the "leaker" who apparently provided the information that Mr. Bakaly
was asked to confirm. The fact that no one has come forward or been identified (or,
apparently, sanctioned) lends a certain scapegoat quality to Mr. Bakaly.
70. Bakaly's Proposed Findings of Fact, supra note 50, 31, at 14-15 (quoting Govern-
ment's Exhibit 14, supra note 44, at 4).
71. It is worth noting that a close reading of the Bakaly Declaration reveals that the
paragraphs of the Declaration in which the allegedly false statements appeared relate to
specific conversations between Mr. Bakaly and Mr. Van Natta on specific dates. See generally
Bakaly Declaration, supra note 16. The defense contends that whatever conversation oc-
curred about the "four options" took place seven days after the conversations described in
those paragraphs; thus, his statements could not have been false. Bakaly's Proposed Find-
ings of Fact, supra note 50, 28, at 14; id. 65, at 26. Eds.-The district court, in acquit-
ting Mr. Bakaly, also noted the "temporal problem" with the Government's proof on this
count. In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 117 F. Supp. 2d 6, 29 (D.D.C. 2000).
72. See Reply Memorandum in Support of Charles G. Bakaly, III's Motion to Dismiss
Pending Contempt Charges at 15, In re GrandJury Proceedings, 117 F. Supp. 2d 6 (D.D.C.
2000) [hereinafter Bakaly's Reply Brief] ("Such confirmation would convey no more infor-
mation than would, in an ordinary criminal case, a prosecutor's confirmation of a re-
porter's statement that the grand jury will either indict or not indict.").
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that there was "substantial and credible" evidence that Mr. Clinton
had committed "high crimes and misdemeanors" potentially warrant-
ing impeachment. v3 In any case, it had been publicly reported that
certain of Mr. Starr's advisors believed that he could indict a sitting
president and, indeed, that Mr. Starr had been persuaded by Profes-
sor Rotunda that a president could be tried, but not imprisoned, while
in office.74 Why else would Mr. Starr be considering and deciding this
question if not to debate the OIC's options vis-A-vis indictment?
Whatever one concludes about whether confirmation that the
OIC was actively debating these options was in fact "non-public," it
seems to me that the Government's proof as to the extent of Mr.
Bakaly's involvement was fairly limited. According to the defense:
Mr. Bakaly testified that he did not tell Mr. Van Natta that
these options had been discussed during an internal OIC
meeting, did not tell Mr. Van Natta that there was an internal
OIC meeting at all, did not tell Mr. Van Natta what the OIC
was considering or not considering, and did not tell Mr. Van
Natta what weight was being given to any of the options. The
Government offered no contrary evidence.7 5
In response, the Government argued that:
[w]hat occurred in this case is that on January 28, one day
after the all-attorneys meeting in the OIC, Van Natta specifi-
cally knew that the OIC had recently held a meeting at which
all four options were listed on a board and discussed. In
other words, Van Natta knew that all four options were
under current consideration by the OIC. There can be no
dispute that that was non-public, internal OIC information.
In the face of what Van Natta already knew, therefore, Mr.
Bakaly's confirmation that the four options were "available"
to Mr. Starr was manifestly a confirmation of the accuracy of
Van Natta's non-public information about the recent meet-
ing and OIC deliberations .... Even if Mr. Bakaly did not
tell Van Natta about the meeting or the four options in the
first instance, he helped to give Van Natta a seat at the con-
73. H.R. Doc. No. 105-310, at 1 (1998) ("[T]he Office of the Independent Counsel...
hereby submits substantial and credible information that President William Jefferson Clin-
ton committed acts that may constitute grounds for an impeachment.").
74. Mr. Bakaly provided numerous examples of such reports. See Bakaly's Proposed
Findings of Fact, supra note 50, at 16 n.5.
75. Id. 32, at 15 (citation omitted).
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ference room table on January 27 by confirming the accu-
racy of the information Van Natta had.76
At bottom, the Government's position seems to be that Mr.
Bakaly's limited confirmation could have been understood by Mr. Van
Natta to imply a further confirmation of the fact that there was a meet-
ing at which these issues were discussed. This inference itself seems
questionable in light of the fact that Mr. Van Natta did not report on
the January 27 meeting in the article in question 77 (and, had it been
reported, the fact of such a meeting would have been the only true
"news" in the article). In any case, it is difficult to conclude beyond a
reasonable doubt that Mr. Bakaly lied in denying that he provided
"non-public" information based not on what he actually said to the
reporter, but rather on the inferences that a reporter may have taken
from what was said (but apparently found to be an insufficient basis
for reporting). This seems precious thin ground upon which to rest a
criminal contempt case.
78
2. Mr. Bakaly Told Mr. Van Natta That a Perjury Count Based on the
President's Deposition in the Jones Lawsuit Was a Stronger Case Than the
Perjury Count Being Tried in the Senate.-Mr. Bakaly does not concede
that he made this statement, and he questions the accuracy of the
testifying FBI agent's recollection in this regard.79 Whatever the
truth, Mr. Bakaly's alleged opinion was widely shared and publicly ex-
pressed by a number of commentators.8 0 His view would only be
"non-public" news, then, if it represented a statement of opinion by
the OIC.
The defense argues that the Government failed to prove that Mr.
Bakaly told Mr. Van Natta that the views expressed were those of the
OIC. The defense theory is that if the statements were made, they
were expressions of Mr. Bakaly's personal opinion and did not reveal
internal OIC matters.8" The Government argues that "by virtue of
76. Government's Proposed Findings of Fact, supra note 43, 64(a), at 20 (citations
omitted).
77. See Van Natta, supra note 6, at 1.
78. Eds.-The district court concluded that "[w]hile the Court finds that Mr. Bakaly
did confirm and discuss with Mr. Van Natta that these were indeed four options regarding
indictment of the President that were available to the OIC, the Government has not
proven that these discussions delved into the OIC's internal, 'non-public' deliberation of
these options." In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 117 F. Supp. 2d 6, 28 (D.D.C. 2000).
79. See Bakaly's Proposed Findings of Fact, supra note 50, 38-47, at 17-20.
80. See id. at 19 n.7 (listing commentators who stated their belief that a perjury case
based upon two portions of the President's grand jury testimony would be more difficult to
prove than perjury in the Paula Jones case).
81. See id. 40-42, at 18.
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Bakaly's position in the OIC and the context in which the discussions
were taking place, it is clear that Mr. Bakaly was necessarily providing
information about the work and thought processes of the 01C. '8 2
Again, the Government's argument seems to hinge on what Mr. Van
Natta might have drawn from Mr. Bakaly's statement rather than the
plain import of the words themselves. And again, given that Mr. Van
Natta did not actually report that this was the view of the 01C, the
inference that Mr. Van Natta understood Mr. Bakaly to be speaking as
Mr. Starr's mouthpiece in this regard is subject to substantial
question. 3
3. Mr. Bakaly Told Mr. Van Natta That Professor Rotunda Was Not
in the Office Much and That Mr. Udolf Left the OIC in April or May 1998,
and May Be Biased Against the OIC.-Mr. Bakaly concedes that he "'re-
minded"' Mr. Van Natta of this information.84 The parties do not
contest that Mr. Udolfs departure from the office and Professor Ro-
tunda's role as an OIC consultant were public facts.8 5 The Govern-
ment contends, however, that:
Mr. Bakaly's comments on Mr. Rotunda's absence from the
office and Mr. Udolf s possible biases did convey non-public
information. Those comments would necessarily have sig-
naled to Van Natta that he should not rely on information
learned from either Rotunda or Udolf-and indeed, Bakaly
conceded that is what he intended. 6
"Reminding" Mr. Van Natta of this type of scuttlebutt was hardly a
disclosure of important "inside" information that revealed the office's
deliberations regarding indictment. Telling Mr. Van Natta to beware
of these potentially suspect sources says little about what is going on
within the OIC-especially since Mr. Van Natta apparently did not
confirm that these were his sources or communicate the substance of
82. Government's Proposed Findings of Fact, supra note 43, 64(b), at 21.
83. Eds.-The district court held that because Mr. Bakaly's opinion regarding the rela-
tive strength of the perjury charges was not reflected in the Times article, "it could not
comprise one of the alleged grand jury leaks that movants complained of in their motion
to show cause," and thus was "immaterial to that motion." In re Grand Jury Proceedings,
117 F. Supp. 2d at 29. The court concluded that "[a]ny discussion of immaterial, 'non-
public' matters cannot properly prove the criminal contempt charge against Mr. Bakaly."
Id.
84. Bakaly's Proposed Findings of Fact, supra note 50, 49, at 20 (quoting Govern-
ment's Exhibit 14, supra note 44, at 1-2).
85. See id. 50, at 21; Government's Proposed Findings of Fact, supra note 43, 64(c),
at 22.
86. Government's Proposed Findings of Fact, supra note 43, 1 64(c), at 22 (emphasis
added).
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their disclosures. Thus, Mr. Bakaly's attempt to raise issues regarding
their reliability as sources could not even be said to send a signal re-
garding the accuracy of any specific information provided. 7
4. Mr. Bakaly Told Mr. Van Natta That Mr. Starr Relies Quite a Bit
on the Advice of Professor Kelley.-Mr. Bakaly admits making this com-
ment to Mr. Van Natta. ss The fact that Professor Kelley was a consul-
tant to the OIC, and that he is a friend and former law clerk of Mr.
Starr's, was public knowledge.8 9 The Government, however, argued
that "[b]y telling Van Natta that Judge Starr relies quite a bit on Mr.
Kelley's advice, Mr. Bakaly may well have permitted Van Natta to draw the
conclusion, also reported in his article, thatJudge Starr agreed with Mr.
Kelley's view on the indictability of the President."9"
Again, it is difficult to see how Mr. Bakaly's comment can truly be
characterized as "non-public" information indicative of the OIC's
thinking regarding possible indictment. To me, it is self-evident that
Mr. Starr reached out to employ Professor Kelley, a friend and former
employee, because he valued Professor Kelley's advice. I view this as
an obvious makeweight because the "information" leaked seems so ob-
vious-indeed, this is something I (by no means an OIC insider at the
time) knew or assumed to be true. It would never occur to me that
this type of information would be considered "non-public," so I have a
hard time concluding that someone should go to jail for making a
similar judgment. In any case, the Government's argument again is
that Mr. Bakaly lied about providing "non-public" information, not
because he actually provided such information and did not disclose it,
but rather because a reporter might have drawn inferences regarding
the goings-on in the OIC from the innocuous comments Mr. Bakaly
actually made." Perhaps this type of argument would support a deci-
87. Eds.-The district court concluded that "[a] Ithough the Court has found that Mr.
Bakaly made these statements to Mr. Van Natta, it is not apparent how these comments
disclose material, 'non-public' matters.... They do not prove that Mr. Bakaly's specific
statement that he declined to discuss non-public matters with Mr. Van Natta is false." In re
Grand Jury Proceedings, 117 F. Supp. 2d at 29 (citations omitted).
88. See Bakaly's Proposed Findings of Fact, supra note 50, 54-55, at 22.
89. See id. 1 58, at 23; Government's Proposed Findings of Fact, supra note 43, 1 64(d),
at 22 (conceding that these are "publicly known facts").
90. Government's Proposed Findings of Fact, supra note 43, 64(d), at 22 (emphasis
added).
91. See id.
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sion to fire Mr. Bakaly; it hardly serves as a legitimate basis to jail
him.92
5. Mr. Bakaly Confirmed That the OIC Was Doing Research at the Na-
tional Archives.-Mr. Bakaly early on told representatives of the 0IC
that he had provided Mr. Van Natta with a redacted, internal OIC
document (referred to as the Bates Memorandum) that contained
quotations from, and descriptions of debates among, Watergate prose-
cutors regarding the propriety of indicting President Nixon.9" Mr.
Bakaly also apparently confirmed to Mr. Van Natta that the 0IC had
done research at the National Archives.94 Mr. Van Natta used quoted
portions of the Bates Memorandum and reported that "Mr. Starr's
lawyers ... obtained copies of prosecution memorandums in the Na-
tional Archives written by the Watergate prosecutors."95 The Govern-
ment argues that "this information was not public" and that "It]he
National Archives research concerns a matter internal to the OIC, re-
flecting the investigative and analytical steps its attorneys were taking
in the process of evaluating whether to indict the President."96
This asserted basis for conviction strikes me as even weaker than
the last. Given that Mr. Bakaly disclosed to the GIC that he had pro-
vided the redacted memorandum that contained some of the Na-
tional Archives research, it is difficult to argue that he intentionally
sought to withhold the fact that he confirmed the National Archives
92. Eds.-The district court held that this comment made by Mr. Bakaly provides "a
very slim basis for a criminal contempt conviction." In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 117 F.
Supp. 2d at 29. The court further explained that:
[i]n order to attach significance to this information, the reporter is required to
infer that this reliance on Professor Kelley's advice confirms that Independent
Counsel Starr has concluded that he has the authority to indict a sitting Presi-
dent. Even though the Court concurs with the Government's argument that Mr.
Bakaly was clearly trying to suggest to the reporter this unspoken piece of sensi-
tive and "non-public" information, the Court is not willing to conclude that Mr.
Bakaly's inferential message is identical to stating directly that the Independent
Counsel has concluded that he has the authority to indict the President. While,
in certain circumstances, a wink and a nod are unquestionably tantamount to
outright confirmation, the Court is unwilling to base a criminal conviction on Mr.
Bakaly's unelaborated hint to Mr. Van Natta.
Id. at 29-30.
93. See Bakaly Declaration, supra note 16, 9, at 3.
94. See Government's Proposed Findings of Fact, supra note 43, 64(e), at 22 (citing
the testimony of FBI Agent Thomas Lewis, who stated that Mr. Bakaly conceded this point
in a February 25, 1999 interview). Despite the Government's assertion, it should be noted
that Mr. Bakaly does not make such a concession. See Bakaly's Proposed Findings of Fact,
supra note 50, at 23 n.13 ("[T]here is no evidence that Mr. Bakaly in fact confirmed [that
the OIC was doing research at the National Archives].").
95. Van Natta, supra note 6, at 1.
96. Government's Proposed Findings of Fact, supra note 43, 1 64(e), at 23.
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research. Further, this stretches the outer limits of any definition of
"non-public" information. If the OIC prosecutors secured library
cards, would that constitute "inside information"? Perhaps, again, my
view is affected by the fact that I knew well in advance of the Times
article that members of the OIC were doing research at the National
Archives and never considered that this might be confidential, delib-
erative information. My own conclusion was that, given their mandate
and statutory responsibilities, it was not at all surprising that OIC pros-
ecutors were doing so. I have been told by one member of the media
that he, too, knew of the research efforts, as presumably did the staff
at the National Archives and others.
C. Conclusion
In sum, I do not condone what Mr. Bakaly was doing in attempt-
ing to "spin" Mr. Van Natta-it is not a function that I believe is ap-
propriate to a prosecutor's office. It also appears that Mr. Bakaly was
not as forthright as he should have been with either the OIC or the
court. But it seems to me that the evidentiary basis of this case is very
thin. The fact that the last two arguments were even put forth by the
Government underscores just how weak its position is. We can specu-
late as to why the DOJ said that it would prosecute the case as a crimi-
nal contempt at the court's election.97 My own supposition is that the
DOJ acted out of a disinclination to antagonize the ChiefJudge of the
District Court rather than out of any conviction regarding the impor-
tance of the case. It is worth remembering that the DOJ declined to
bring a criminal false statements or perjury prosecution founded on
the above proof, presumably because the case did not meet DOJ stan-
dards. It may have failed the DOJ test both because of evidentiary
difficulties, and because the alleged false statements concerned leaks
that did not violate Rule 6(e) and indeed concerned leaks all but two of
which did not even appear in the news article at issue (and one of the two was
the bogus National Archives charge). In short, this is a case that should
not or would not have been brought in the normal course.
II. THE PRiss's ROLE IN HIGH-PROFILE CRIMINAL CASES
The ironies surrounding the Bakaly case abound. First and fore-
most, of course, is the fact that, as of this writing, the only person
caught up in "Monica-gate" subjected to a criminal trial and under
immediate and concrete threat of criminal punishment is a member
of prosecutor Kenneth Starr's office. Not Ms. Lewinsky, who, by her
97. See Letter from Michael Horowitz, supra note 32, at 2.
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own immunized account, committed various and sundry federal
crimes.98 Not President Clinton, who many believe to be even more
culpable than Ms. Lewinsky. No, it is Mr. Starr's "counselor and
spokesman" who is being prosecuted-at Mr. Starr's referral-by the
Justice Department, whose ultimate chief is, of course, Mr. Starr's, and
for a time, Mr. Bakaly's, nemesis.
Mr. Bakaly is alleged to have lied when he denied discussing a
number of subjects with Mr. Van Natta, but none of those subjects were
ones that involved secret grand jury information guarded by Federal
Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e).99 The charge of contempt of court
brought against Mr. Bakaly is founded, then, not on allegedly illegal
leaking, but rather on the allegations that Mr. Bakaly lied in denying
that he leaked and obstructed the course of justice in doing so. In
short, the case supposedly is not about sex-I mean the propriety of
Mr. Bakaly's otherwise legal leaking-it is about lying about sex-I
mean leaking. See where I am going here?
As should be clear from my discussion above, regardless of
whether the district court concludes that Mr. Bakaly actually lied
about these matters and finds that the other elements of contempt
(materiality and interference with the due administration of justice)
have been proved, it seems to me that this case is a weak one. One
must ask, then, why it was pursued. What does the case reveal about
the effect of the press on the quality of criminal justice accorded
targets (or others) where scandal-driven criminal investigations are at
issue? And, given the context, what does the case reveal about the
role or responsibilities of the press in such investigations?
A. Why Investigatory Targets and Prosecutors Leak and Spin
Any criminal investigation of high-ranking political officials justi-
fiably rates very high in the media's estimation of newsworthy topics.
Certainly the appointment of an independent counsel, whether under
DOJ regulations or under the lapsed independent counsel statute, °°
confers upon an investigation an instant imprimatur of credibility and
importance. In these cases, virtually everything-including topics al-
most never discussed in reference to "ordinary" prosecutors, such as
98. See, e.g., Michael Grunwald, Hardball at the Ritz Puts Starr on the Spot; Critics Question
Tactics Against Lewinsky, WASH. POST, Sept. 23, 1998, at Al (reporting that "Starr's aides
warned [Lewinsky] that she could face 27 years in prison on charges of perjury, obstruc-
tion ofjustice and witness tampering on the PaulaJones case").
99. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
100. The independent counsel statute lapsed on June 30, 1999, pursuant to its "sunset"
provision. 28 U.S.C. § 599 (1994).
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staff hires and office expenditures-seems to find its way into the pub-
lic realm via the press. 1 ' What makes the press's role particularly in-
teresting in this context is not, however, its wide range or sheer
volume-it is the consequence of those qualities.
The certainty of extensive press attention creates its own dynamic
that has had a demonstrable effect on the legacy of individual inde-
pendent counsels and the viability of the statute itself.10 2 More impor-
tant for present purposes, white-hot media attention may also have a
profound effect on the conduct and course of a criminal investigation.
These consequences usually have been said to flow from the interac-
tion between politics and the media-that is, from the simple fact that
political partisans understand the power of the press to direct public
attention and shape opinions. In highly politicized cases, such as the
"scandals" we have just endured, some of those at the center of the
inquiry, and many at the periphery, are more concerned with the po-
litical consequences of the investigation than its resolution in the
grand jury or the courts. As I have argued elsewhere:
Given the public and press attention devoted to [indepen-
dent counsel (IC)] investigations, partisans cannot afford to
let the IC process simply unfold and the political chips fall
where they may. Recent experience demonstrates that the
favored means by which [investigatory targets and their polit-
ical allies seek] to blunt the political damage posed by an IC
investigation is to attack as biased the IC, or the judges that
appointed him....
Conversely, the opposing political party has every
incentive to keep the case in the news, to press for a result
discrediting the person under investigation and the adminis-
tration with which that person is affiliated, and to create
grave questions about the impartiality or judgment of an IC
who exonerates the subject.10 3
101. See, e.g., Connie Cass, Starr Reports $4.2 Million in Contract Work; Counsel Defends
Money Spent for Investigators, Advice, Legal Representation, WASH. POST, Aug. 28, 1999, at Al0
(detailing the amount of money spent by Independent Counsel Kenneth Starr on private
investigators and on outside legal and ethical advisors); David A. Vise, Criminal Probe of
Clinton 'Open" Counsel Hires Staff, Weighs Indictment, WASH. PoST, Apr. 11, 2000, at Al (re-
porting that Independent Counsel Robert W. Ray hired six lawyers and projected spending
$3.5 million over six months to continue the OIC's investigation of the Lewinsky scandal).
102. SeeJulie R. O'Sullivan, The Independent Counsel Statute: Bad Law, Bad Policy, 33 Am.
CRiM. L. REV. 463 passim (1996).
103. Id. at 464, 474.
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Politicians have learned to look to the press to air their attacks,
and the press has cooperated because charges of the politicization of
the criminal process are indeed highly newsworthy (at least if they
have some potential to be true).
What has come into focus during this last investigation is the ex-
tent to which the press attention has affected the conduct of lawyers
engaged in some capacity in the investigation. As many have noted,
increasingly:
attorneys [in high-profile white-collar cases] appear just as
interested in winning in the court of public opinion as in a
court of law....
. . ."Feeding" the media with information and "spin-
ning" a case so that the facts and circumstances are viewed in
a light most favorable to one's client has now become a com-
mon practice. 1°4
Strategic use of the press by the defense is demonstrably on the
upswing in these cases, and some prominent prosecutors-in the DOJ
as well as in the office of Mr. Starr-believe that the prosecution, too,
must sometimes speak out in order to safeguard the perceived integ-
rity of investigations subject to defense attack.10
To understand the strategy of the game, one must understand
the constraints imposed on the players by the grand jury process itself.
White-collar criminal investigations of the type of wrongdoing that is
often at stake in cases involving highly placed political actors (e.g.,
corruption, false statements, and obstruction) most often are con-
ducted by prosecutors and agents under the authority of a federal
grand jury. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e) imposes upon
prosecutors, agents, grand jurors, and all others involved in the gov-
ernmental process an obligation to maintain the secrecy of matters
occurring before the grandjury. 10 6 The rule does not, however, muz-
zle the witnesses who provide that grand jury with evidence, or those
104. Eric H. Holder, Jr. & Kevin A. OhIson, Dealing with the Media in High-Profile White
Collar Crime Cases: The Prosecutor's Dilemma, in WHITE COLLAR CRIME 1995 at B-I (ABA 1995);
see also Moses, supra note 4, passim.
105. See Holder & Ohlson, supra note 104, at B-1 (stating that prosecutors must at times
speak to the media to protect their public image and to demonstrate to the public that the
system of justice is applied equally to all citizens).
106. FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e) (2). The rule states that:
A grand juror, an interpreter, a stenographer, an operator of a recording device,
a typist who transcribes recorded testimony, an attorney for the government, or
any person to whom disclosure is made under paragraph (3) (A) (ii) of this subdi-
vision shall not disclose matters occurring before the grand jury, except as other-
wise provided for in these rules.
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with whom the witnesses share their stories, including, of course, wit-
nesses' lawyers.10 7 Those who are subpoenaed to provide evidence-
either physical or testimonial-may freely detail for the press and
public just what they have provided to the government, as well as what
they have learned (through the questions asked or the items re-
quested by subpoena) about the direction or content of the
investigation.
A further layer of complexity is provided by the fact that the
bounds of Rule 6(e) are not well-defined, 10 8 leaving prosecutors to
navigate, to some extent, at their own risk when they choose to talk.
Further, there are a variety of constraints quite apart from Rule 6(e)
that counsel against prosecutorial discussion of even clearly non-
grand jury investigative materials.10 9 The ethical rules that apply in
mostjurisdictions generally bar prosecutors from making extrajudicial
statements that may negatively influence public proceedings, and, in
particular, that may compromise the impartiality of decision-mak-
ers.1 10 DOJ policy also bars discussion of all but specified types of in-
formation, again, generally in the interests of safeguarding the
"adjudicatory process," but leaves prosecutors several large "outs."1 1 '
107. See id. (failing to include such persons within the coverage of the rule and stating
that "[n]o obligation of secrecy may be imposed on any person except in accordance with
this rule").
108. See Richman, supra note 4, at 339-42.
109. See Moses, supra note 4, at 1816-26.
110. The Model Rules of Professional Conduct bar lawyers participating in the investiga-
tion into or litigation of a matter from making extrajudicial statements "that a reasonable
person would expect to be disseminated by means of public communication if the lawyer
knows or reasonably should know that it will have a substantial likelihood of materially
prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding in the matter." MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT
R. 3.6(a) (1999); see also MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILrTY DR 7-107 (1994) (stating
that attorneys should disclose, without elaboration, nothing more than "(1) Information
contained in a public record. (2) That the investigation is in progress. (3) The general
scope of the investigation . . . [and] (4) A request for assistance in apprehending a
suspect").
111. Both the DOJ regulations and the United States Attorneys Manual articulate rather
strict general standards regarding discussions with the press. See 28 C.F.R. § 50.2(b) (2000)
(limiting information DOJ officials can release in a criminal matter to basic facts about the
defendant-name, age, and other background information-and facts relating to the
charge or the arrest); 4 DEP'T OFJUsTICE MANUAL, tit. 9, § 1-7.530(A) (2d ed. Aspen Law &
Bus. 2000-01 Supp.) [hereinafter U.S.A.M.] (barring DOJ personnel from "respond[ing]
to questions about the existence of an ongoing investigation or comment[ing] on its na-
ture or progress, including such things as the issuance or serving of a subpoena, prior to
the public filing of the document"). But each gives prosecutors the discretion to stray
from these rules. For example, the United States Attorneys Manual states that:
[i]n matters that have already received substantial publicity, or about which the
community needs to be reassured that the appropriate law enforcement agency is
investigating the incident, or where release of information is necessary to protect
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If a prosecutor "believes that in the interests of justice and law en-
forcement process" 112 non-grand jury information should be made
public, or where "release of information is necessary to protect the
public interest, safety, or welfare," 113 she may disclose this investiga-
tory information to the public (after securing relevant approvals).
Perhaps more important than these rules is the professional cul-
ture that counsels against public discussion of ongoing investigations,
at least in some prosecutorial circles. That culture is founded not only
on the above rules, but also on the interests underlying those rules,
which include law enforcement imperatives, institutional concerns,
and the professional self-definition of prosecutors as "ministers ofjus-
tice." Most obviously, loose lips can sink cases:
Premature disclosure of investigative data-identity of
targets, nature of allegations, nature of proof-can lead
targets to flee, destroy evidence, intimidate or deter wit-
ness[es], create phony evidence, and otherwise impede in-
vestigations. Even disclosures that do not trigger
obstructionary behavior can impede the government's inves-
tigatory powers by drying up information sources that rely on
the promise or assumption of confidentiality.
1 14
Secrecy in the grand jury context is also justified, at least in part,
to "insure the utmost freedom to the grand jury in its deliberations,
and to prevent persons subject to indictment or their friends from
importuning the grand jurors."115 Finally, silence is necessary to pro-
tect the privacy of subjects, targets, and witnesses caught up in grand
jury investigations where the investigation does not lead to an indict-
ment. 16 In light of the shattering consequences that disclosure of
involvement in a criminal investigation may have on an individual's
the public interest, safety, or welfare, comments about or confirmation of an
ongoing investigation may need to be made.
U.SA.M., supra, § 1-7.530(B); see also 28 C.F.R. § 50.2(b) (9) (allowing DOJ prosecutors,
subject to the approval of the attorney general or deputy attorney general, to avoid abiding
by the regulations if that prosecutor "believes that in the interest of the fair administration
ofjustice and the law enforcement process information beyond these guidelines should be
released").
112. 28 C.F.R_ § 50.2(b) (9).
113. U.S.A.M. § 1-7.530(B).
114. Richman, supra note 4, at 345 (footnote omitted); see also Douglas Oil Co. v. Petrol
Oil Stops Northwest, 441 U.S. 211, 219 n.10 (1979).
115. Douglas Oil Co., 441 U.S. at 219 n.10 (quoting United States v. Proctor & Gamble
Co., 356 U.S. 677, 681-82 n.6 (1958), quoting in turn United States v. Rose, 215 F.2d 617,
628-29 (3d Cir. 1954)).
116. See id. (stating that grand jury secrecy is justified, in part, "to protect the innocent
accused who is exonerated from disclosure of the fact that he has been under
investigation").
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life, 1 1 7 prosecutors often conclude that basic fairness dictates that
publicizing the fact that an investigation is ongoing (let alone the de-
tails of it) is only warranted once a grand jury has passed on the pro-
priety of formal criminal action. At the very least, most prosecutors
recognize the fundamental illegitimacy of leaking to influence those
who may be the eventual adjudicators of the defendant's guilt."' Cer-
tainly prosecutors who leak to score political points or to blacken the
reputation of an investigatory subject are acting completely beyond
the professional pale.
Given the rationales for secrecy in the investigative process, why
are lawyers for both sides increasingly turning to the court of public
opinion-and thus the press? From the defense's perspective,
"[p]erhaps the most important catalyst [for attempting to try cases in
the press] is that a growing number of lawyers and clients believe a
public relations strategy can get results in certain kinds of cases. If so,
the lawyers reason, they have a duty to pursue such a strategy on be-
half of clients."" 9 The kinds of cases in which a public relations strat-
egy makes particular sense are those in which the clients are of a type
that generate a great deal of media attention, and in which the clients
are concerned with "the judgment of a number of people and institu-
tions-not just juries."12 ° Thus, lawyers attempt to use the press to
117. See Fund for Constitutional Gov't v. Nat'l Archives & Records Serv., 656 F.2d 856,
864 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (stating that "'[t] here can be no clearer example of an unwarranted
invasion of personal privacy than to release to the public that another individual was the
subject of an FBI investigation'" (quoting Baez v. Dep't of Justice, 647 F.2d 1328, 1338
(D.C. Cir. 1980))).
118. The DOJ regulations explicitly prohibit this type of disclosure:
At no time shall personnel of the Department of Justice furnish any statement or
information for the purpose of influencing the outcome of a defendant's trial,
nor shall personnel of the Department furnish any statement or information,
which could reasonably be expected to be disseminated by means of public com-
munication, if such a statement or information may reasonably be expected to
influence the outcome of a pending or future trial.
28 C.F.R. § 50.2(b)(2) (2000).
119. Moses, supra note 4, at 1831. Four members of the Supreme Court have recog-
nized that "[a] n attorney's duties do not begin inside the courtroom door.... [A] n attor-
ney may take reasonable steps to defend a client's reputation and reduce the adverse
consequences of indictment ... including an attempt to demonstrate in the court of public
opinion that the client does not deserve to be tried." Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 501 U.S.
1030, 1043 (1991) (opinion of Kennedy, J., joined by Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens,
J.); see also Holder & Ohlson, supra note 104, at B-i ("Some casual observers of this process
may believe that the attorneys involved in such [use of the media in high-profile white-
collar cases] are attempting to improperly influence the jury pool or are simply seeking to
thrust themselves into the limelight. But more astute observers understand that in high
profile white collar cases, there are important and legitimate reasons why attorneys cooper-
ate with the media.").
120. Moses, supra note 4, at 1832.
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further their clients' interests in minimizing the political or other col-
lateral fallout of an investigation or prosecution, as well as to influ-
ence the outcome of that investigation or prosecution. 21
Defense lawyers are becoming increasingly sophisticated and
overt in their use of press relations 122 and, at least in politicized cases,
are increasingly relying on an attack strategy. The strategy may be
stated simply as "putting the government on trial," with the object of
demonstrating that the investigation or prosecution is meritless or
trivial and is inspired by political or personal animus. Prosecutors
usually attribute such a "strategy" at best to zealous representation and
at worst to cynical manipulation. It is also true that such attack efforts
are often founded on a sincere (and sometimes accurate) belief that
the client is being wronged, and that the prosecutor is at best over-
reaching and at worst corrupt.
The most effective means of attack is obviously to demonstrate
that the prosecutor is acting illegally, improperly, or, at the very least,
outside the norms of prosecutorial practice. Such attacks may take a
variety of forms. One fairly obvious example from recent history is the
charge that the OIC was overzealous in pursuing a potential criminal
perjury case based on alleged false statements made in a civil deposi-
tion context. By arguing that such cases are not normally pursued,
the inference was that the OIC was acting selectively and out of im-
proper purpose.
Attacks that are founded upon arguments regarding general poli-
cies or practices, however, are less effective than arguments that prose-
cutors have violated clear rules and thus are not only unfair, but also
lawless. Because there are not that many concrete "rules" that apply
to prosecutors in the investigative stage, those that apply to the con-
duct of the grand jury provide the best opportunity for the defense to
demonstrate that a prosecutor is acting beyond the law. For example,
it is common and effective strategy to charge prosecutors with violat-
ing grand jury secrecy.12 Again, this can be done, as I believe it is in
121. See id. at 1832-40 (discussing targets of public relations campaigns, including the
public, judges, prosecutors, executive branch policy makers, and opposing litigants).
122. See generally id. passim.
123. See, e.g., Peter Baker & Susan Schmidt, Clinton Vows 'Never' to Resign, WASH. POST,
Feb. 7, 1998, at Al (quoting President Clinton's attorney David Kendall as stating that
"[t]he leaking of the past few weeks is intolerably unfair .... These leaks make a mockery
of the traditional rules of grand jury secrecy. They often appear to be a cynical attempt to
pressure and manipulate witnesses, deceive the public and smear persons involved in this
investigation."); Roberto Suro, Judge Cites 24 Stories in Ordering Leak Probe, WAsH. POST, Oct.
31, 1998, at A6 (quoting White House special counsel Gregory Craig as stating, "[wie be-
lieve that the Office of the Independent Counsel has been waging a campaign of leaks
against the president, in an improper effort to influence public and congressional opinion,
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most cases, in a sincere effort to force the prosecutor to hew to the law
and to contain the damage that such disclosures can cause to investi-
gatory targets' reputations, professional or business interests, and so-
cial or family relations, or it can be done for the simple purpose of
putting the prosecutor at a disadvantage.
What of prosecutors? Do they simply take their hits and wait for
vindication at trial? Many do, and properly so. However, in heavily
politicized cases the answer increasingly seems to be "no." A number
of legitimate reasons are said to support governmental disclosure of
(non-grand jury) investigative materials prior to indictment.'24 Pub-
licity may aid the law enforcement effort, for example, by causing wit-
nesses to come forward125 or, as was alleged in the Lewinsky matter, by
putting pressure on potential cooperators to make a deal quickly.1 26
Further, "[m] uch to the interest-and sometimes chagrin-of law en-
forcement authorities, in the course of reporting a story, members of
the media sometimes uncover additional information that bolsters the
prosecution's case."1 27 Discussions with the media about pending
cases is also said to further the law enforcement mission in a larger
sense by reassuring the prosecutor's client-the public-that possible
wrongdoers or crimes are being vigorously pursued, thus building
confidence in the criminal justice system.128
and it has done so in direct violation of federal laws safeguarding the confidentiality of
grand jury proceedings").
124. See, e.g., Holder & Ohlson, supra note 104, at B-i to B-2 (observing that prosecutors
in high-profile white-collar cases appeal to the media to educate the public about the en-
forcement of the laws, to reassure the public that the law is being applied equally to all
citizens, and to motivate witnesses to cooperate in ongoing investigations). There are also
less admirable motives, such as ego gratification, the desire to curry favor with the media,
the wish to improve the prosecutor's or agent's image for personal career reasons, a plan
to taint the jury pool, or hopes of harming an investigatory subject.
125. See id. at B-2 (stating that "publicity frequently causes potential witnesses to come
forward and share with law enforcement authorities information they have about a particu-
lar case"); Richman, supra note 4, at 346 (explaining that disclosure may compel criminals
seeking leniency to come forward and may "prod non-culpable people into providing new
information, by triggering memories, or by merely assuririg them that the government is
pursuing a case").
126. See, e.g., Howard Kurtz, In a Blizzard of Allegations, Did the Media Throw Caution to the
Wind?, WASH. POST, Jan. 27, 1998, at El (noting that "[1] ittle has been reported about the
motivation of the sources providing the allegations to reporters, although some of the
leaks are attributed to 'investigators' or 'sources close to the investigation' of independent
counsel Kenneth W. Starr," and that "[t] his means that journalists, unwittingly or not, may
be helping prosecutors put pressure on Lewinsky by acting as conduit for selective bits of
damaging information").
127. Holder & Ohlson, supra note 104, at B-2.
128. See id. at B-1.
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Finally, and most important for present purposes, some prosecu-
tors believe that "in cases involving well-known people, the public has
a right to be kept reasonably informed about what steps are being
taken to pursue allegations of wrongdoing so that they can determine
whether prosecutors are applying the law equally to all citizens." '2 9
The political context will often dictate what must be said in order to
counter attacks of selective and unfair prosecution. Thus, DOJ prose-
cutors may feel compelled to speak to reassure the public that they are
not sweeping wrongdoing by high-ranking public officials under the
rug. Independent counsel may wish to talk to the press in order to
counter allegations that they are engaging in partisan witch-hunts or
are generating or exaggerating claims of official wrongdoing.
This last rationale for prosecutorial comment has fans at the
highest ranks of the Clinton Justice Department as well as in the office
of Mr. Starr. For example, Deputy Attorney General Eric Holder has
argued that misperceptions, fed by public officials under investiga-
tion, about the motivations of prosecutors "have a corrosive effect on
our system of justice, and the only effective means by which prosecu-
tors may dispel them is through the dissemination of timely and accu-
rate information. '"130 Similarly, Mr. Starr (relying in part on Mr.
Holder's statements) frequently invoked this justification for his of-
fice's press contacts.13 1
129. Id. (emphasis added).
130. Id. at B-2. It should be noted, however, that although Deputy Attorney General
Holder's comments have been widely cited as sanctioning prosecutorial comment in such
circumstances, and his introductory comments unequivocally do so, see id. at B-1 to B-2, the
balance of the paper in which these comments appear contains a much more detailed and
specific discussion, founded on DOJ rules, of the specific types of information that may be
disclosed and the particular considerations that should apply in making these judgments.
See id. at B-2 to B-7. In other words, I believe it is a mistake to read Mr. Holder's remarks as
an invitation for prosecutors to open wide the spigot of information any time defense
counsel takes a shot at them. Indeed, Mr. Holder's concluding remarks make clear that his
orientation is ultimately fairness, and not vindication:
The best policy for any prosecutor to follow when discussing a pending criminal
matter with reporters is to always be fair and cautious, and to always keep in per-
spective the significance of the case. Although a case or defendant may seem of
overwhelming importance at the time that the press is howling for information
and details, eventually every case-no matter how sensational-recedes from the
headlines as other pressing issues of the day come to the fore. But what lingers
on in the mind of the public, and what remains permanently affixed in the mem-
ories of one's colleagues, is how the media inquiries about such cases were han-
dled. If they were consistently handled ethically, fairly, and effectively, then one
of the greatest responsibilities-and challenges-of a modern day prosecutor will
have been admirably fulfilled.
Id. at B-7.
131. When questioned by David E. Kendall about Mr. Bakaly's appearance on ten talk
shows and Nightline, Mr. Starr responded:
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This certainly sounds good-why shouldn't the Government re-
spond to attempts to mislead the public and impair confidence in the
criminal justice system? There may be a number of reasons. First, this
rationale has no readily ascertainable standards and obviously can be
(honestly or not) abused. What constitutes a sufficient attack to war-
rant a prosecutorial response? What limits are there (outside of Rule
6(e)) on the types of information prosecutors may disclose in re-
sponse to such attacks? When the target of the investigation denies
wrongdoing and says that the allegations are baseless, may prosecutors
respond by leaking evidence of guilt? When the defense argues that
prosecutors are out to get the target, may the Government respond by
sharing with the press the goods that indicate that the prosecution has
a factual, and not political, predicate?
Second, one wonders why, if official credibility is the goal,
prosecutorial press contacts should ever be off-the-record. Professor
John Barrett has argued that such contacts should occur only at the
highest levels, should be made generally and not to individual report-
ers, and should "always, and only, [be] on the record." '32 A policy
that "[a]nonymity should end and accountability should begin"133
would have the virtue of "demonstrat[ing] law enforcement's substan-
tive commitment to fair play and restraint in using the powerful voice
of government."1"4 It would also force prosecutors to be conservative
in employing this rationale for making public statements. Finally, it
would "permit law enforcement officials to be held accountable both
for their statements and for the substantive acts that on-the-record
statements can explain, thereby eliminating the 'who said what' mys-
teries that stem from the media protecting their sources and too often
are the end of today's leaks investigations."18 5
Most fundamentally, one could argue that prosecutors, if they are
wise, will never enter the fray; if they do, experience demonstrates
Not only do we have the right, we have the duty to engage in a proper public
information function because this is the public's business. We must do so in or-
der at times to combat misinformation that is being spread about, including fre-
quently by lawyers who claim that their clients have been grossly mistreated,
which is what criminal defense lawyers are paid to do.
Starr Is Questioned by Abbe D. Lowell and David E. Kendall, WASH. POST, Nov. 20, 1998, at A36;
see also Editorial, An Unruly Mess, WASH. POST, Feb. 25, 1998, at A16 (quoting Mr. Starr's
explanation for subpoenaing presidential aide Sidney Blumenthal to be that "'misinforma-
tion"' spread about prosecutors may be "'intended to intimidate prosecutors and investiga-
tors, impede the work of the grand jury, or otherwise obstruct justice'").
132. Barrett, supra note 4, at 634.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
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that they will be drawn into a long and damaging seige that they prob-
ably cannot win. Prosecutors and defense counsel are not on a level
playing field in this game. Prosecutors are hampered in their re-
sponses to defense attacks not only by the constraints discussed above,
but also by the widespread public belief that prosecutors must hew to
a higher standard. To the extent that prosecutors are perceived to be
engaging in a public relations battle with the targets of what is sup-
posed to be a dispassionate search for truth and justice, they have lost
the war in public perception. Further, if a prosecutor begins with,
and is consistent in implementing, no matter the temptation, a policy
that he will not comment on the investigation, he will be much less
vulnerable when accusations of leaking fly. Once prosecutorial
tongues start wagging, however, it is difficult to draw, let alone police,
the appropriate lines of commentary. No one-least of all the press,
to whom prosecutors have been chatting-will necessarily credit deni-
als of improper leaks. In sum, it appears that the more prosecutors
talk, the more likely they are to feed the credibility war rather than
dampen it.
Whatever the scope, form, or wisdom of appropriate prose-
cutorial commentary, it is important to note that the justification as-
serted by Mr. Starr rests on the reactive quality of such commentary:
discussions with the press are only warranted to clean up damage
caused by unfair or misleading charges by those under investigation.
Many of the attacks in this case were overt-Mr. Starr and the Presi-
dent's counsel engaged in highly public, lengthy, recurring, and very
bitter skirmishing over the source of leaks. 136 Some caught up in this
war claim that the defense also employed a more subtle tactic-what I
refer to as the "reverse-spin-leak." The defense in this scenario desires
not only to leak information to the press in a way that lessens its nega-
tive impact while remaining anonymous, but also to get the story out
in a way that leaves the impression that it was leaked by prosecutors.
Thus, the leaker may score points by presenting to the press, in a
more sympathetic light or at a more advantageous time, damaging
facts that the leaker anticipates will become public in any case.' 37 Fur-
136. See, e.g., Susan Schmidt, Clintons' Lawyer Alleges Ethics Breach by Starr; Article Cited;
Whitewater Investigator Says No Secrecy Rules Were Violated, WASH. PosT, June 4, 1997, at A7
(discussing David Kendall's accusation that Mr. Starr is running a "leak-and-smear" cam-
paign against the Clintons and Mr. Starr's response); Kendall: 'A Deluge of Illegal Leaks,'
WASH. PosT, Feb. 7, 1998, at A13 (reprinting a letter from David Kendall, President Clin-
ton's personal attorney, to Kenneth Starr, accusing the OIC of leaking inaccurate grand
jury information, and Mr. Starr's response).
137. That this type of leaking occurs seems uncontested. See, e.g., Howard Kurtz, Some-
one's Always Spilling Something in Washington, WASH. PosT, Sept. 23, 1998, at D1 (stating that
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ther, the leaker aims to rack up additional points by accusing the pros-
ecutors of inappropriate or illegal leaking. That the facts leaked were
damaging (though not as harmful as they would have been if they had
come to light under different circumstances or at another time) en-
hances the credibility of the charge that the facts must have come
from prosecutors.
This strategy obviously depends upon the leaker's ability to main-
tain her anonymity. It thus depends upon the reporter's willingness
to run the story without specific attribution. More fundamentally, it
counts (with substantial justification in recent experience) upon the
media's refusal to disclose the identity of confidential sources and
others' inability or unwillingness to root out or force such a
disclosure.
The "reporter's privilege" to refuse to disclose confidential
sources is, at best, a qualified one in the context of a criminal investi-
gation.1 38 However, as a matter of reporters' ethics, "[o]nce [they]
have taken information off the record, they are obligated-by per-
sonal honor, traditions of their craft, and a pragmatic desire to pre-
serve reputations of trustworthiness, but certainly not by law-never
"White House aides, meanwhile, are so practiced in this realm [of leaking] that they have
leaked damaging information about their boss as a way of putting it behind them, some-
times doing the deed on a busy news day or a Friday night to minimize the publicity").
Certainly prosecutors thought that this was happening:
Starr asserted that defense lawyers have their own motives to secretly disclose in-
formation. "The 'leaks' that you complain about, thus, may have come from
sources close to those under investigation," Starr said. "Those sources would have
a clear and manifest motivation to release harmful information with carefully
crafted defenses in order to lessen the painful impact of such evidence when it is
revealed through official proceedings."
Baker & Schmidt, supra note 123, at Al.
138. See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 667 (1972) (plurality opinion) (holding that
requiring reporters to appear before a federal grand jury does not abridge First Amend-
ment rights). The Branzburg Court explained:
[W]e perceive no basis for holding that the public interest in law enforcement
and in ensuring effective grand jury proceedings is insufficient to override the
consequential, but uncertain, burden on news gathering that is said to result from
insisting that reporters, like other citizens, respond to relevant questions put to
them in the course of a valid grand jury investigation or criminal trial.
Id. at 690-91. Subsequent cases affirmed the principles set forth in Branzburg. See Cohen v.
Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 669 (1991) (citing Branzburg and stating that "the First
Amendment [does not] relieve a newspaper reporter of the obligation shared by all citi-
zens to respond to a grand jury subpoena and answer questions relevant to a criminal
investigation, even though the reporter might be required to reveal a confidential
source"); Univ. of Penn. v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182, 201 (1990) (stating that "[iun Branzburg,
the Court rejected the notion that under the First Amendment a reporter could not be
required to appear or to testify as to information obtained in confidence without a special
showing that the reporter's testimony was necessary").
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to reveal the identity of the source." 'q1  "Leak investigators know this
and, if they also understand the value of free and aggressive reporting
in a constitutional democracy, they tend not even to ask reporters,
much less seek to enforce subpoenas that might compel them to de-
scribe who told them what and when." 4 ° As a consequence of these
and other factors, leak investigations are notoriously unsuccessful in
definitively isolating the source of leaks-or in clearing innocent par-
ties accused of leaking. 4 ' Finally, despite isolated calls to arms, 142 re-
porters apparently have been disinclined to throw themselves into
investigations of their fellow journalists' sources-even where the
source of press leaks is major news.1 43
Was this reverse-spin-leak strategy actually employed by President
Clinton's defense team? Maybe some persons aligned with the admin-
istration undertook this approach, but I personally do not believe that
the President's legal team did so. One could as easily accuse the pros-
ecution of a nefarious "reverse-reverse-spin-leak" attack, under which
prosecutors falsely accuse the defense of employing a reverse-spin-leak
strategy in order to make the defense look like cynical manipulators
of public opinion (and guilty as hell). I also do not believe that this
was the case. But the point is that we will never know just how far the
spin game spun out of control because the guardian of the secret is
139. BRUCE M. SWAIN, REPORTERS' ETHics 52 (1978).
140. Barrett, supra note 4, at 624 (footnote omitted).
141. See id. at 623; Richman, supra note 4, at 341 (explaining that "in the absence of a
confession by a law enforcement source (or, even less likely, a reporter with no interest in
being a future beneficiary of leaked information) leaks are virtually impossible to prove"
(footnote omitted)).
142. For example, an editorial in the Washington Post questioned the absence of report-
ing on the sources of leaks and stated that:
there would seem to be a very good reason for reporters to try to learn the source
of their competitors' leaks. After all, we are investigating a possible political and
legal scandal here, and the leaks-forbidden both by statute and by judicial pro-
hibition-are an integral aspect of that illegality. Why should journalists conspire
to cover up such crimes?
William Raspberry, Editorial, Neglected Story: Who's Leaking?, WASH. POST, Mar. 13, 1998, at
A25.
143. For example, the Washington Post reported:
[T]here was a bizarre quality to the weekend coverage of White House charges
that independent counsel Kenneth Starr was illegally leaking in the Monica
Lewinsky case. At least some journalists at each major news organization know
whether Starr's staff is in fact dishing on background, but the stories are written
as though this were an impenetrable mystery.
Howard Kurtz, With Leaks, Reporters Go with the How, WASH. PosT, Feb. 9, 1998, at B1; see also
Howard Kurtz, The Media's Starr Turn; Independent Counsel Draws Increased Scrutiny, WAH.
PosT, Feb. 4, 1998, at DI (discussing allegations that Starr "received relatively gentle treat-
ment [by the press] until now . . . [because] reporters depend on his office for crucial
leaks").
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the press, and the press is not telling. This press silence had a central
role in the escalation of the bitter battle for public relations advan-
tage. In other words, the lack of real-time information about who was
leaking to the press fueled the perceived need to meet leak with leak,
spin with spin. Because of each side's apparent conviction that the
other was employing unattributed leaking (and perhaps reverse-spin
and reverse-reverse-spin leaking) to strategic effect,144 the dynamic
was considerably magnified to the point where it became a very impor-
tant and consuming story in its own right.
B. The Role of the Press in Responding to Parties' Leaking and Spinning
Which brings us, at last, to the subject of this Article: What does
this state of affairs imply for journalists' practice of their craft? There
are a number of levels that may warrant examination-proceeding
from the very general to the specific case of Mr. Bakaly.
1. Consideration of the General Systemic Consequences of Leaks on the
Administration of Justice.-Reporters obviously seek to report that
which is news, they are most interested, then, in obtaining and pub-
lishing the very nonpublic information that traditional prosecutorial
practice-as well as, in some circumstances, federal law-proscribes
law enforcement sources from sharing. When seeking to elicit such
information, one may first ask whether reporters should consider the
generalized public policy reasons for maintaining the secrecy of this
information prior to publishing it.
Some, but apparently not all, journalists may be concerned about
the consequences of their reporting.145 It seems, however, that the
default position of the media generally, and most reporters in particu-
lar, is that news-gathering and dissemination in the grand jury context
is in the public interest-virtually without limit. The criminal justice
system's emphatic protection of investigatory information notwith-
144. See, e.g., Rotunda, supra note 4, at 882-83 (the author, a consultant employed by the
OIC, discussing strategic leaking by the defense); Baker & Schmidt, supra note 123, at Al
(reporting that in response to defense charges that "'someone else is leaking unlawfully
out of the grand jury proceeding,'" Mr. Starr "fired back with his own statement last night,
saying leaked information about the investigation could have come from numerous peo-
ple-including Clinton's own attorneys-and accusing the president's camp of trumping
up complaints about leaks as part of 'an orchestrated plan to deflect and distract this
investigation' ").
145. See, e.g., SWAIN, supra note 139, at 54-59. To be clear, the above discussion focuses
on considerations implicated in reporting on investigative information, and particularly
grand jury functioning. I do not mean to suggest that the media never considers public
policy concerns-such as national security concerns-when making decisions regarding
whether to publish particular pieces of news.
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standing, many reporters seem to believe that in the overwhelming
majority of cases, there is no cognizable individual interest and no real
societal cost to publication of such information-or at least no inter-
est or cost that reporters should be required to consider.
The Supreme Court has determined that in most circumstances
where there is a real conflict between the criminal justice system's
need to obtain evidence from the press and the press's interest in
maintaining the confidentiality of its sources, any First Amendment
interests implicated must take a back seat to those of the criminal pro-
cess. a46 The Court, however, might strike a different balance when
the conflict is between the criminal system's interest in keeping infor-
mation from the press and the press's responsibilities in informing the
public. Indeed, one could argue that the law has implicitly resolved
this tension. In general, the rules against provision of investigatory
details to the press are far from airtight, and even Rule 6(e) does not
purport to impose an obligation of secrecy on those not expressly
bound by the rule who receive improperly shared information.147 First
Amendment interests, then, generally trump law enforcement inter-
ests in this context, and perhaps rightly so. Asking reporters to forego
a story in light of public policy considerations at this level of abstrac-
tion invites too great a compromise of their essential function.
In any case, whatever the legal or policy resolution of this tension,
it is exceedingly unrealistic to expect the press to decide in high-pro-
file cases that the generalized reasons why investigatory secrecy may be
important to the functioning of the system as a whole are sufficient to
kill a story that otherwise seems newsworthy. Thus, although I throw
this suggested topic out in the interest of completeness, consideration
of the general public policy concerns implicated by disclosure of sensi-
tive investigative data-even grand jury material-is not a topic over
146. See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 667 (1972) (plurality opinion); supra note
138.
147. FED. R. CuM. P. 6(e)(2) (stating that "[n]o obligation of secrecy may be imposed
on any person except in accordance with this rule"); see also United States v. Jeter, 775 F.2d
670, 675 (6th Cir. 1985) (stating that "[b]y its own terms, ... 'Rule 6(e) applies.., only to
individuals who are privy to the information contained in a sealed document by virtue of
their positions in the criminal justice system.'" (quoting Worrell Newspapers of Ind., Inc. v.
Westhafer, 739 F.2d 1219, 1223 (7th Cir. 1984))); Fund for Constitutional Gov't v. Nat'l
Archives & Records Serv., 656 F.2d 856, 870 n.33 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (stating that "Rule 6(e)'s
prohibition on disclosure applies only to individuals who have had access to that informa-
tion by virtue of their relationship to the grand jury investigation or under another provi-
sion of the rule"); In re Polypropylene Carpet Antitrust Litig., 181 F.R.D. 680, 693 (N.D. Ga.
1998) (noting that none of the cases cited by the parties "holds that a private party-
whether a newspaper reporter, an attorney, or a disinterested citizen-is obliged under the
literal terms of Rule 6(e)(2) to refrain from releasing information when that party,
through no affirmative act of his own, comes into possession of grand jury materials").
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which reporters would spend much time struggling and thus is not
one upon which I will dwell further.
2. Consideration of the Results of the Leak-and-Spin Dynamic Wit-
nessed in High-Profile Cases.-The second layer of inquiry deals more
specifically with the particular dynamic discussed in Part II.A above,
which raises at least two challenges for journalists that may be worthy
of more prolonged discussion. The first challenge concerns how the
parties' efforts to use the press to achieve strategic advantage in high-
profile (particularly politically sensitive) cases affects journalists' pur-
suit of their basic task-to seek the facts and credibly report them. The
question is how this unattributable leaking and spinning affects both
reporters' ability to accurately report matters of vital public interest
and the trust invested in reporters by their readers. The second chal-
lenge concerns howjournalists should, in slogging through the swamp
of spin, behave when they have become, in essence, the heart of the
story. What responsibilities do reporters and news organizations have
to their public when they, as receivers and purveyors of leaks, become
central to a dynamic that has important ramifications for the fair and
effective administration of criminal justice-both in systemic terms
and in individual cases?
Journalists might acknowledge the above-described dynamic and
respond, "so what?" They would no doubt assert that despite the
machinations of politicians, lawyers, or investigatory targets, the
press's fundamental obligation remains constant-to report the news.
The coverage of the Lewinsky grand jury investigation may have set
new (and I hope final) records for the extent to which reporters re-
lied upon unnamed sources.14 Decisions to report news that con-
148. See, e.g., Kurtz, supra note 137, at DI (discussing the proliferation of leaks that has
coincided with the Lewinsky scandal, stating that "the sheer velocity of the Lewinsky saga
makes it hard to follow the anonymous action without a scorecard"). Washington Post re-
porter Howard Kurtz again touched on this phenomenon, reporting that:
[w] hat's remarkable, for a secret grand jury investigation, is how quickly reporters
are obtaining sensitive information about Lewinsky's discussions with
prosecutors....
... But everyone seems to be talking without names attached. The Washing-
ton Post yesterday cited "sources close to the Lewinsky team" (along with "a lawyer
familiar with her account") in reporting that the former White House intern had
spilled the alleged beans about a sexual relationship with Clinton and their dis-
cussions about keeping it secret. USA Today ("two people with knowledge of the
deal"), the New York Times ("two lawyers familiar with her account"), the Washing-
ton Times ("lawyers close to the probe") and other news organizations reported
similar details.
Howard Kurtz, Eager Media Revel in Another Starr Turn, WASH. POST, July 30, 1998, at Bi.
Earlier that year, Post reporter Howard Kurtz had reported:
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cerns not only the substance of an unresolved criminal investigation,
but also details of the most intimate sort, based on unnamed sources,
have been justified on the ground that it was the only way to get the
story. Members of the media, relying on such precedents as Water-
gate, contend with justification that the fact that this information is
being leaked by persons who will not go on record cannot bar report-
ers from pursuing the facts and reporting them.'49 Responsible re-
porters, the argument goes, recognize their sources' not-so-hidden
agendas and respond accordingly.15 ° A good journalist will play the
spinning sides off of each other, talk to a variety of sources, corrobo-
rate the facts leaked, and record the result."' This is what reporters
would say they always do-regardless of the subject-matter under
consideration.
Further, one could argue that as long as the information is accu-
rate the press should not care whose ox is being gored by its release.
If the defense is leaking for damage control or for more nefarious
purposes, it is of little moment as long as the story is true. Similarly,
The furious pace of the coverage of alleged sexual misconduct in the White
House has all but shattered traditional media standards and opened the flood-
gates to a torrent of thinly sourced allegations and unrestrained speculation....
That is the view of some media critics, academics and journalists, such as
James Fallows, editor of U.S. News & World Report, who argued that much of the
reporting has "gotten out of control."
Kurtz, supra note 126, at El.
149. See, e.g., Kurtz, supra note 143, at BI. Post reporter Howard Kurtz noted:
Those who defend leaks (which is to say, most journalists) point to their value in
ferreting out malfeasance: the Pentagon Papers, Watergate, and so on. Unless
reporters are free to vacuum up leads from whistle-blowers, disgruntled officials,
police sources and so on, much important information would never become
public.
Id.; see also Robert G. Kaiser, A Word to Post Readers; More About Our Sources and Methods,
WASH. Posr, Mar. 15, 1998, at CI (acknowledging that readers and many journalists are
"infuiated by anonymous sourcing," but stating that "we also think our readers should
know that sometimes granting anonymity to sources is the only way to acquire publishable
information on matters of interest and importance to them. So, if we have confidence in
our information, we will print it.").
150. See, e.g., Howard Kurtz, The Sources of the Leaks; Anonymous Tipsters Duel It Out in the
Newspapers, WASH. PosT, Feb. 7, 1998, at B6 (quoting Michael Oreskes, the New York Times'
Washington bureau chief as stating that "whenever you use unidentified sources, there is
an even higher threshold than when you name your sources to be certain you've checked
the information and you're certain you're not being used, and we do it").
151. See, e.g., id. (quoting Michael Oreskes as stating, when asked about differences
between the Times' account and the Post's account of the same story, "We called the White
House early in the day and gave them plenty of time to react and we published every word
of that reaction."); Kurtz, supra note 143, at BI (stating that "[m]ost prosecutors don't
simply call reporters and hand them neatly packaged evidence. In the real world, journal-
ists collect bits and pieces and then seek guidance or confirmation from those running an
investigation.").
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whether prosecutors choose to share nonpublic facts to counter misin-
formation or to taint the jury pool, what matters is that the public gets
the information it needs. Indeed, once the credibility of the informa-
tion is established, the only reason that the leaker's motivation is rele-
vant is if it turns out to be independently newsworthy-for example,
where (as the opposing camp inevitably charges) the leak is designed
to mislead the public or undermine its confidence in the good faith of
the Government's or defense's efforts.
Finally, one could point to the degree to which the stories that
relied on unnamed sources proved accurate to justify reporters' deci-
sions to report what and as they did.152 Does the fact that much (al-
though by no means all) of the information reported proved true-
the existence of a semen-stained dress, the cigar story, the phone
sex-demonstrate that no further soul-searching is in order?15 Does
this establish that the press did its job and need have no further con-
cern about its role in the scandal or the effect of its choices on the
administration of criminal justice?
I think these are substantial questions because the ultimate accu-
racy of the facts derived from unnamed sources is not the only consid-
eration here. Given the public controversy surrounding how those
facts were obtained, and the potential consequences of that contro-
versy, the sourcing of the stories had an importance separate from the
facts reported.
There are two principal reasons why a continuing discussion of
reporters' sourcing decisions in the Lewinsky scandal is worthwhile.
First, being vindicated in hindsight is all well and good, but many re-
porters may have done lasting damage to their credibility by relying so
extensively on unnamed sources while the investigation was ongoing.
To put it bluntly: readers noticed and were perturbed.15 1 Judging
from what I read, many members of the public (and some members of
152. See Howard Kurtz, Reporters, Questioning Themselves, WASH. POsT, Dec. 21, 1998, at C1
(stating that "(s] ome journalists view the impeachment vote as some sort of validation" and
quoting Newsweek's managing editor, Ann McDaniel, as stating "[w]hereas we've been criti-
cized for coverage of the facts, virtually all of that proved to be true.").
153. For a critique of the press's performance in the scandal, see Steven Brill, Pressgate,
in B~iLL's CONTENT, Parts 1-6 (July/Aug. 1998). For objections to Mr. Brill's analysis, see,
for example, Letters from Susan Schmidt, Reporter, the Washington Post, and Kenneth W.
Starr, Independent Counsel, to Steven Brill, Editor, Brill's Content, reprinted in BRILL'S
CONTENT (July/Aug. 1998).
154. See, e.g., Kaiser, supra note 149, at C1 (acknowledging that "many readers are infuri-
ated by anonymous sourcing"); Geneva Overholser, Editorial, How About Some Restraint?,
WASH. POST, Feb. 8, 1998, at C6 (discussing readers' concerns and noting that "[t]he
Lewinsky story calls for particular care first because of the sourcing-thin at the onset and,
as the sources grew more numerous, very problematic").
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the press)155 thought, at the time, that this was shoddy journalism,
and after-the-fact vindication may not completely erase the taint. The
Washington Post responded to its readership's complaints about the
overuse of anonymous sources in reporting on the Lewinsky investiga-
tion by saying, basically: "We are pros. Trust us."156 The Post asserted
that "[w] e know we will be accountable for our accuracy. We hope
that readers will judge The Post by its reliability. Nothing is more im-
portant to us than our credibility."157 But are the Post and the press in
general truly accountable in these circumstances?
Because of the exceptional circumstances of this case-the publi-
cation of the grand jury transcripts, the disclosure of the Starr refer-
ral, and the congressional impeachment proceedings-the public was
able to evaluate the press's accuracy in recounting the facts leaked.
What is worth remembering, however, is that these media practices
were ongoing long before it became clear that a full account would be
forthcoming. Real-time accountability, then, was not a foregone con-
clusion. If we are concerned here with the lessons of this scandal and
its legacy, one may wonder whether we will be so "lucky" in the future
and whether reporters should reconsider their practices in the face of
a future in which such accountability may not be so promptly or ex-
tensively available-and thus the damage done to public trust may be
more lasting.
Further, the "accountability" made possible by the public record
is confined to the facts, not the sourcing, in these articles. And those
who followed the press coverage closely have reason to question
whether some of the attributions used were entirely accurate or pro-
vided readers with a fair basis for evaluating the information provided.
For example, at least one associate of the OIC has suggested that re-
porters used attributions that tended to imply that the facts came
155. See, e.g., Howard Kurtz, Sleazy Pickings: Vindication, of a Sort, for Journalists, WASH.
Pos-r, Sept. 14, 1998, at B1. Howard Kurtz, a writer for the Washington Post, shared a senti-
ment similar to that of readers:
If you listen carefully, you can hear the sound ofjournalists slapping themselves
on the back. After all, 99.5 percent of what they reported about President Clin-
ton and Monica Lewinsky was right there in Ken Starr's report. Vindication
city! ...
Well, not so fast. True, the media bloodhounds deserve credit for staying on
the trail while White House aides scolded them for being out of control. But a
flimsy, thinly sourced story is still shoddy journalism-even if the reporter lucks
out and the charge turns out to be accurate. Good reporting is about nailing
down facts, not publishing secondhand suspicions.
Id.
156. See, e.g., Kaiser, supra note 149, at Cl (responding to reader criticism of the Post's
extensive use of unidentified sources).
157. Id.
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from anonymous sources within or associated with the OIC when they
actually came from persons unaffiliated with that office.' 58 Certainly
the Times article at the heart of the Bakaly case-one of the few in-
stances in which readers had the opportunity to examine sourcing de-
cisions-creates serious issues regarding the potentially misleading
nature of unnamed attributions.
Mr. Bakaly concedes that he faxed to Mr. Van Natta a redacted,
internal OIC memorandum often referred to as the "Bates Memoran-
dum."1 59 The Bates Memorandum consisted of quotations from, and
descriptions of, debates (all derived from public sources) among the
Watergate prosecutors as to whether and when to indict President
Nixon."6 Mr. Van Natta attributed at least three of these quotations
to "associates of Mr. Starr," 6 making it appear that the quotations
described an ongoing discussion within the OIC, rather than a debate
that happened long before in the Watergate prosecutors' office. 6 2
Perhaps I am alone in this, but such an attribution strikes me as obvi-
ously incorrect. Perhaps Mr. Van Natta had a knowledgeable source
associated with the OIC who confirmed that such statements were be-
ing echoed (verbatim) in debates then being held in Mr. Starr's office;
unfortunately, we are unlikely to ever know whether such a source
existed.
The same Times piece points up another problem, which (I am
told) arises with some frequency when reporters accept off-the-record
information, particularly from institutional sources. The Times article
stated that Mr. Bakaly "declined to discuss the matter" and then
158. See Rotunda, supra note 4, at 875-77, 882-87 (discussing examples of leaks attributed
to sources within or associated with the OIC that actually came from other sources).
159. Bakaly's Pre-Trial Brief, supra note 18, at 7-8.
160. Id.
161. Van Natta, supra note 6, at 1.
162. See Bakaly's Pre-Trial Brief, supra note 18, at 8. The historical excerpts (under-
scored) were contained in the following excerpts from the Times piece:
(1) Those in favor [of indicting a sitting President] have cited a view held by some
prosecutors in Mr. Jaworski's office that "a failure to indict the incumbent Presi-
dent, in the face of evidence of his criminal activity, would seriously impair the
integrity of the criminal process," an associate of Mr. Starr said.;
(2) Another argument in favor is that "prosecutors should pay no heed to consid-
erations of national interest," an associate of Mr. Starr said. As a prosecutor in
Mr. Jaworski's office said in 1974: "We have a duty to act without regard for exter-
nal factors. It is not for us to weigh the political effects.";
(3) But several of Mr. Starr's prosecutors have also said that the Nixon-era prose-
cutors considered both the risk that the Supreme Court would ultimately strike
down an indictment and the impact on the nation.
Van Natta, supra note 6, at 1 (underscore added); see also Bakaly's Pre-Trial Brief,
supra note 18, at 9 (citing the above mentioned passages and noting those portions taken
from the Bates Memorandum).
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quoted Mr. Bakaly as stating that "[w]e will not discuss the plans of
this office or the plans of the grand jury in any way, shape or form." 16 3
This seems to the uninitiated (me) as inaccurate-regardless of
whether one adopts the Government's view of the Bakaly case or Mr.
Bakaly's own position-because Mr. Bakaly did in fact "discuss the
matter" extensively with Mr. Van Natta.
I understand that reporters covering institutions may confront a
dilemma when their institutional sources give them on-the-record re-
sponses of "no comment" while providing them newsworthy material
off-the-record or on background. Reporters in such a situation may
feel obliged to report the official "no comment," and will further use
the other information and attribute it to anonymous "sources."
Viewed from the perspective of the reader, this is misleading; the story
implies that the anonymous "source" is separate and apart from the
institutional actor purportedly refusing comment. However, the com-
mitment to letting both sides be heard while providing all relevant
information puts reporters in a real bind. They may feel that they
cannot, in a straightforward way, provide the necessary news and perti-
nent sourcing without compromising the anonymity promised the
source (and their relationship with that source).
Whatever one's resolution of this dilemma in the normal case,
the Times piece exacerbated the problem by both including quotes (at-
tributed to an "associate" of Mr. Starr) from the very source who pur-
portedly "declined to comment" and then quoting that source to state,
"[w] e will not discuss the plans of this office or the plans of the grand
jury in any way, shape or form."1 64 Although, if you accept Mr.
Bakaly's version of his interaction with Mr. Van Natta, the latter state-
ment is probably literally true, it strikes me as even more misleading
than the "declined to discuss the matter" given the context. Its em-
phatic tone and wide-ranging scope implies that the office had im-
posed a complete blackout on information relating to the article,
when in fact Mr. Bakaly had spoken to Mr. Van Natta at length about
the piece and had, at the least, provided him the memorandum from
which Mr. Van Natta drew quotations that he attributed to the office.
The opportunity to examine the sourcing decisions in the Times
piece is unusual. Although it is also hardly reassuring, I am willing to
accept that sourcing decisions are generally more straightforward.
The point is, however, that questions about the accuracy of descrip-
tions of anonymous sources have been raised, and readers will never
163. Van Natta, supra note 6, at 1.
164. Id.
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
know whether such attributions were fair. The brutal pressures of the
twenty-four-hour news cycle and the superheated competition to re-
port on the unfolding mega-story may explain some mistakes or mis-
judgments. It may also be, however, that some misleading sourcing
flowed from conscious decisions made to enhance the credibility of
reports, to shield sources or reporters, to curry favor with important
sources of information, or to achieve other ends. Certainly the reader
is not generally privy to how individual reporters or news organiza-
tions resolve the dilemma discussed above with respect to the simulta-
neous provision of information and on-the-record refusals to
comment. What we do know is that the suggestion that the characteri-
zation or treatment of the leaking sources may not have been entirely
honest or straightforward creates large credibility issues for the press.
Another credibility issue is raised when the recipient of the
leaked information subsequently reports on responses to the leak-
particularly where a reporter documents accusations as to the sources
of leaks when she knows those accusations to be untrue. A recent
controversy illustrates the point. On the day that Vice President Al
Gore was scheduled to speak to the Democratic National Convention,
Pete Yost of the Associated Press reported that, according to "legal
sources . .. who are outside [Independent Counsel Robert] Ray's of-
fice," Mr. Ray had empaneled a new grand jury to hear evidence
against President Clinton in the Monica Lewinsky scandal.165 Mr. Yost
later reported on the outraged reactions of Democrats who believed
that Republicans intent on hurting Vice President Gore were the
source of the leak.166 Shortly thereafter, Judge Richard Cudahy ad-
mitted that he had inadvertently divulged the grand jury secret to a
reporter (presumably Mr. Yost) during a press inquiry (although what
prompted the inquiry is still subject to examination). 167 Did Mr. Yost,
as one member of the press has charged, 16' act unethically? Mr. Yost
"kept a poker face, reported the facts, and protected his sources" 16 9-
all to the good. Mr. Yost also made clear that his sources were not
within Mr. Ray's office, so readers were in a position to judge for
themselves charges that the leaks came from Mr. Ray. But what about
charges that the leaks came simply from "Republicans"? As it appears,
165. Pete Yost, Grand Jury to Hear New Clinton Case, ASSOCIATED PREss, Aug. 17, 2000.
166. Pete Yost, Grand Jury Again Looks at Clinton; Gore Backers Blast Timing of News Leak,
ASSOCIATED PREss, Aug. 18, 2000.
167. See Susan Schmidt, judge Was Source of Clinton Jury Story; Leak 'Inadvertent,' Carter
Nominee Says, WASH. POST, Aug. 19, 2000, at Al (reporting Judge Cudahy's admission).
168. See Jack Shafer, The Associated Press Plays Dumb, SLATE, at http://slate.msn.com/
code/Pressbox/Pressbox.asp?Show=8/22/00&idMessage=5937 (Aug. 22, 2000).
169. Id.
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but is not yet completely established because we do not know if Mr.
Yost was tipped to the story and Judge Cudahy merely confirmed it, if
the Democrats' speculations about Republican leaking were false, and
Mr. Yost knew that, was he justified in reporting them? What infer-
ences might careful readers be warranted in drawing from the fact
that Mr. Yost, who presumably knows the source of his own story, is
reporting such accusations? Would a reader be correct in assuming
that Mr. Yost would not print information he (apparently) knew was
false? This assumption would appear to be incorrect, but absent
Judge Cudahy's unusual public concession of responsibility, the public
would not know that.
Given the spinning dynamic discussed above, one would imagine
that reporters, and thus readers, are not infrequently faced with such
questions. Asking reporters to recuse themselves from follow-up sto-
ries regarding their own sources may be impractical and an illusory
solution in view of their news organizations' probable knowledge of
the sources. Absent such recusals, however, one might argue that the
reporters invite a public backlash. While readers may understand re-
porters' unwillingness to disclose their sources, they may come to con-
clude that the media is acting simply as a conduit for leaks and spin,
with predictable consequences for the credibility of news reports.
There is a second reason-apart from the accountability and
credibility concerns discussed above-that I believe sourcing has con-
tinuing importance even where disclosures by anonymous sources are
later proved factually true. Where the parties are leaking, spinning,
and attacking each other for the same (i.e., when the dynamic de-
scribed in Part II.A is in full swing), it is no longer true that the sourc-
ing of an article matters "only" in providing readers some basis for
judging the value or credibility of the information offered and thus
becomes irrelevant once the information is proved accurate. In this
context, public battle is joined over "leaking"-over the sourcing, as
well as the facts. The public, one would think, had a right to know
whether the defense camp's bitter attacks on Mr. Starr's alleged abuse
of his office through illegal leaking were correct, in whole, in part, or
not at all. Conversely, the public had an interest in knowing whether
these charges by the President's defenders were, as members of Mr.
Starr's office implied, attempts to divert and even obstruct a legitimate
investigation, or whether they represented the honest outrage of dedi-
cated defenders. The failure of the press to get to the bottom of these
issues at the time, while continually airing the cycle of lawyerly spin-
ning and leaking, had important consequences.
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Leaks stories certainly consume a great deal of public attention.
At the very least, they are (and, some would argue, are designed to be)
a distraction. Questions of "who told what to whom and when" divert
scarce resources to largely futile leak-hunts. If one were to tote up the
amount of time, money, and attention that investigators, lawyers,
judges, court personnel, executive branch officials, and others de-
voted to the pursuit, discussion, litigation, and adjudication of issues
relating to leaks in the Lewinsky matter, I am sure that the totals
would be a disgrace-measured at least in terms of what other crimi-
nal justice ends could have been served with those resources.
When attributions are not entirely forthright-for example, sug-
gesting that the source of the "leaked" information has a closer nexus
to the prosecutor than is true-there also exists the possibility that
leak investigators and courts asked to adjudicate contempt sanctions
against the government will be misled. 7 ° Even if sanctions are not
ultimately imposed on an innocent party, the misleading quality of
attributions may result in litigation that damages innocent persons
and diverts the parties from the real business at hand-the investiga-
tion and defense of alleged criminal wrongdoing.
The constant attacks and counter-attacks by counsel for both
sides also have a very real effect on the lawyering in these cases. The
charges are no doubt demoralizing to government lawyers, and may
well deter professional personnel from joining investigations such as
Mr. Starr's. Further, many tactical decisions regarding how an investi-
gation should be conducted-and, on the defense side, what ap-
proach one should take in responding to it-are influenced to a large
170. Eds.-The district court, in acquitting Mr. Bakaly, felt compelled to note that it
found "deeply disturbing" the evidence that Mr. Van Natta attributed to Mr. Starr's staff
quotes that actually came from the Bates Memorandum, which cited the quoted statements
as coming from Watergate-era sources. In re GrandJury Proceedings, 117 F. Supp. 2d 6, 25
n.3 (D.D.C. 2000). The court explained:
Mr. Bakaly has made a persuasive showing that historical debates and quotes were
lifted verbatim out of the Bates Memorandum and falsely described as present
day debates within the OIC. The misimpression that this journalistic sleight of
hand produced is quite troubling for what it shows about the reliability of anony-
mously attributed information. More important for the purpose of the present
inquiry, the fraudulent attribution of historical information to present day mem-
bers of the OIC could have had an impact on the Court's determination of the
second prong of [the test for determining whether a prima facie showing has been
made of a violation of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e)]. At the prima
facie stage of [that] inquiry, the Court often has no evidence that goes beyond the
attribution on the face of the article. The use of the redacted Bates Memoran-
dum in the Times article demonstrates how easily the parties and a court can be
led astray by an inaccurate and misleading attribution.
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extent by the trust one believes one may repose in the integrity and
fairness of one's opposing number. The polarizing atmosphere of
mutual recrimination and distrust will therefore necessarily change
the parties' decision-making-perhaps in ways that do not always serve
either the government's or the investigatory target's best interests.
Finally, the atmosphere of attacks may well, if things get as out of
control as they did during the Clinton scandals, make the public
throw up its hands with both sides. Stated in the terms that the com-
batants would use in the heat of the contest, the battle, at its heart, is
about whether the administration of justice is being subverted by a
political partisan masquerading as a prosecutor, or whether a presi-
dent charged with administering justice is attempting through scurri-
lous obfuscation to obstruct that administration. Because of the
perceived special obligations of prosecutors, it would seem that the
attack campaigns do greater damage to the credibility of the govern-
ment investigation17 1 than to the target of the investigation, who may
be expected to publicly resist imputations of wrongdoing. The evis-
ceration of public confidence in the fair conduct of an investigation
may extend far beyond the independent counsel at issue, with predict-
ably adverse consequences for public confidence in prosecutors gen-
erally. In any case, to the extent that neither side is vindicated, the
result is public disgust with a system in which no one seems interested
in arriving at the truth, or a just result, so much as in playing public
relations games and scoring points.
What, then, of the public's "right to know" in this situation, where
what is at issue is, among other things, the efficient administration of
justice, the perceived fairness of the investigation, and, at least in
some circles, the credibility of the press? I, and I assume most mem-
bers of the public, fully understand and support the rationale underly-
ing individual reporters' protection of their confidential sources.
Journalists' interest in maintaining the confidentiality of their sources
is both obvious and weighty. Accepting, then, reporters' absolute obli-
171. See, e.g., Editorial, Legal Ethics and Spin, WASH. POST, May 24, 2000, at A36 (stating
that "[t]he allegations of prosecutorial misconduct did.., divert attention from Mr. Clin-
ton's own behavior and greatly weakened public confidence in Mr. Starr's investigation");
Editorial, Mr. Starr and Leaks, WASH. POST, Sept. 15, 1999, at A24 (opining that "Mr. Starr
was attacked throughout the Lewinsky episode in a coordinated smear campaign that ac-
cused him publicly of a variety of types of misconduct. These accusations seriously under-
mined his investigation and distracted people from sober discussion either of the
president's conduct or of Mr. Starr's probe."); id. ("The allegations [of misconduct against
Mr. Starr] took a great deal of time to investigate and sort out. Now, one by one, they are
proving meritless, but only long after they have done theirjob of eroding confidence in his
investigation.").
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gation to preserve the confidentiality of sources to which they have
promised anonymity, is there anything that reporters can or should do
to address the above concerns? Should journalists consider the actual
consequences of their choices when making decisions about whether
to accept information on a condition of anonymity, whether to go
with a story based on unidentified sources, or whether to use an attri-
bution that may protect the source, but is less than forthright?
I wonder, in particular, whether the rationale for a reporter's pro-
tection of her sources should mean that the entire press corps is dis-
abled from pursuing that which is a story of great social import.
Should all leakers get a pass from all reporters? And, if so, on what
theory? That if reporters were to successfully go after other reporters'
sources, leakers will be deterred? Presumably, reporters do not wish
to kill the fatted calf-singly or collectively-by going after leakers
and reporting on them.' 72 Yet in declining these stories, journalists
are not only declining to inform the public on matters of importance,
but they are also furthering their own interests by ensuring that both
leaking and reports about leaking (but not about the actual identity of
leakers) continue.
Add, then, to the list of ironies that attend the Clinton scandals
the fact that the media, in covering matters like the Lewinsky investi-
gation, are subject to some of the tensions that inhere in the difficul-
ties of finding a credible and effective way to investigate alleged
wrongdoing at the highest reaches of the executive branch. The
press, like the attorney general, labors under a fairly hefty appearance
of a conflict of interest. Reporters' conflict lies in their attempt (or
failure) to report on the leaks that are their bread and butter.173 And
the press in this situation seems subject to the same trade-off between
independence and accountability that independent counsel experi-
ence. Reporters' independence and effectiveness in ferreting out
news-by relying in part on persons they know will leak and lie about
it and by protecting those persons singly and as a group-is in conflict
with the accountability of the press to the public. The press's credibil-
172. See, e.g., Kurtz, supra note 143, at B1 (asking "[w]hy.. journalists raise all sorts of
questions about everyone else's behavior but give themselves a pass when it comes to ob-
taining illicit material" and explaining that "[ o] n one level, the answer is obvious: Journal-
ists live off leaks. They are reluctant to bite the hands that keep feeding them. Many
would just as soon not worry about how the information got to them if it is solid and
sufficiently juicy.").
173. See Editorial, Independent Counsel Implosion, WASH. PosT, March 13, 1999, at A20
(opining that "[t]he subject of leaks is one on which we cannot comment dispassionately.
Soliciting leaks, after all, is part of what a vibrant free press does. And it would be rather
hypocritical for an organization that thrives on such disclosures also to denounce them.").
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ity-which would seem to me at the heart of its mission-depends to
some extent on how it addresses these tensions in future cases.
One reporter has assured me that many journalists would em-
phatically disagree with my observations. Their view would be that
reporters simply are not in the business of making the government, or
the criminal justice system, function effectively or efficiently. If they
report well on matters of public concern, that is the extent of their
obligation. The fact that their reporting may have a pernicious effect,
or may feed an unfortunate dynamic such as that suggested above, is
not their concern. Further, their promises to protect their sources are
ethical or even moral commitments and are not simply the result of a
pragmatic evaluation of the likely deterrent effect that disclosure
might have on future sources. Thus, the practical consequences of
going after other reporters' sources is just not something that they
would worry about. Journalists do not pursue these stories, I am as-
sured, because they believe that it is not an appropriate mission for
reporters to report on how other reporters get stories from sources.
Just as it is none of the government's business who the sources are, it
is none of the public's business either. Stories about sources and their
spinning, this view holds, simply aren't newsworthy.
At bottom, my source and I disagree over whether there is a legiti-
mate public "right to know" in this context. I would submit that even
if individual reporters believe that such stories are not news the major-
ity of news organizations do. Given the extensive and front-page cov-
erage accorded to reports of leaks, leaks investigations, and the
accusations of the opposing sides regarding the propriety of those
leaks, as well as the consequences of this coverage described above, I
believe there is indeed a manifest public interest in how stories are
obtained and in the sourcing of the stories.
3. Consideration of the Impact on Governmental Decisions About
Whether Alleged Leakers Should Be Sanctioned.-Thus far I have explored
more general questions regarding the interaction between the press
and the administration of justice in high-profile cases. Let us return
to Mr. Bakaly and some of the more specific questions raised by his
case. Many editorial writers have condemned the decision to refer or
proceed with the Bakaly prosecution. 174 What these writers have not
174. Editorials in the Washington Post and the Washington Times provide adequate exam-
ples. The Post editorialized:
We don't condone anyone's lying to a court. As we stressed throughout the Clin-
ton-Lewinsky scandal, one cannot waive the duty of candor to the judicial system
when it is inconvenient. At the same time, it would be truly absurd for Mr.
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acknowledged is that the above-described dynamic-in which the
press plays a defining role-made the Bakaly prosecution virtually
inevitable.
We do not yet know what motivated Mr. Starr to make the Bakaly
referral to the Department of Justice. Mr. Starr, who hired Mr. Bakaly
to talk to the press, could not have been surprised that he had done
so. Mr. Starr would no doubt state that it was the lies, not the leaks,
that did in Mr. Bakaly. One may query whether, even assuming that
falsehoods were uttered, they were so egregious that referral for crimi-
nal prosecution and all that entails was the appropriate response. As
discussed above, this case, even after it was fully investigated and for-
mally presented at trial, was a very thin one. And Mr. Starr, by virtue
of his position, was no doubt aware of the enormous personal trauma
and cost that inevitably befall the subject of a criminal referral. What
moved Mr. Starr to throw a colleague to the DOJ wolves on such a
foundation? 75
Bakaly-alone among the figures in the Clinton-Lewinsky ordeal-to be found
criminally culpable for his behavior. The evidence that he lied is not overpower-
ing. And even were it stronger, the bizarre situation in which he found himself
presents strongly mitigating circumstances. Mr. Bakaly surely should have been
more candid when asked about his role. But he has already lost his job over his
failure to do so. That is a heavier price than President Clinton has paid for far
more egregious deceptions of the federal courts.
See, e.g., Editorial, Mr. Bakaly's Tria WASH. PosT, July 20, 2000, at A24. An editorial in the
Times similarly argued:
[I] t's hard to summon the requisite outrage to clamor for putting [Mr. Bakaly]
behind bars....
... Does the phrase "frivolous case" begin to form in the cranial cavity? As
even Julian Epstein, the Democratic counsel on the House Judiciary Committee
and one of Mr. Starr's harshest critics, put it, this is a "terrible" case, a "semantical
game of gotcha. There is no real underlying offense here...."
Editorial, 'No Underlying Offense,'WASH. TIMEs, July 12, 2000, at A22.
175. At the time of the referral, Mr. Starr's office was "battling [with the DOJI over how
[the Department would] conduct a separate disciplinary inquiry into the independent
counsel's alleged misconduct in the investigation that led to Clinton's impeachment." Ro-
berto Suro, Starr Aide Resigns, May Face Prosecution; Justice Dept. Gets Referral in Leaks Probe,
WASH. POST, Mar. 12, 1999, at Al. The level of animosity between the two offices appeared
remarkably high, underscoring the extraordinary nature of Mr. Starr's referral of his for-
mer colleague for DOJ investigation. See id. (reporting that "[tihe already tense dealings
between Starr and the Justice Department reached a new rhetorical pitch yesterday as Dep-
uty Attorney General Eric H. Holder Jr. angrily dismissed as 'crap' accusations by one of
Starr's former deputies that disciplinary action against Starr was designed to disrupt Starr's
investigation of Clinton." And that this response was provoked by Robert J. Bittman, a
former member of Starr's team, who publicly "accused Justice officials of leaking informa-
tion damaging to Starr and said, 'obviously someone at the department has it in for the
Office of Independent Counsel'").
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It seems to me that the best light one could put on the referral is
that the OIC had an underdeveloped record and felt enormous pres-
sure to do something-and fast. Because the allegations of OIC leaks
had played so prominently in the press, and because Mr. Starr had
issued such strong public denials of improper leaking, the office prob-
ably felt that it had no choice but to refer, and quickly. Mr. Starr's
referral is not necessarily obviously craven-Mr. Starr would no doubt
argue that the referral was necessary to guard the credibility of the
OIC and its eventual result, not to avoid personal criticism. The the-
ory may well have been that the press would report claims that the
withdrawal of Mr. Bakaly's declaration and a portion of Mr. Starr's
brief, in the absence of a referral, demonstrated that the OIC con-
doned leaking. No doubt editorials would point out that Mr. Starr, by
failing to pursue criminal action against Mr. Bakaly, objected to some
lies to judges-but only those made by the President and not by Mr.
Starr's own staff.1 76 All of which would have been entirely appropriate
commentary, but for, perhaps, the facts.
Was the media responsible for Mr. Bakaly's predicament? No.
Obviously there were a number of factors at work. But would this case
ever have been brought if the controversy over leaks had not been so
publicly and persistently reported with no resolution of the identity of the
leakers? In other words, if the press had investigated the leaks as assid-
uously as it did the existence of Ms. Lewinsky's dress, would Mr.
Bakaly be on trial? That we will never know the answer to this ques-
tion does not make it less worthy of consideration. It certainly points
up what seems to me evident-that the case against Mr. Bakaly ulti-
mately was about leaking, not lying.
176. Indeed, in a breathtaking display of chutzpah, on February 2, 1999, the New York
Times published an editorial excoriating Mr. Starr for debating criminal prosecution of the
President "at a time when the Senate deserves a calm decision-making atmosphere" and
calling upon the Senate to "slap Mr. Starr back into line." Editorial, Ken Starr's Meddling,
N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 2, 1999, at A18. The Times argued:
Mr. Starr is already regarded by his critics as an obsessive personality. Now he
seems determined to write himself into the history books as a narcissistic legal
crank. Once the Senate started the second Presidential impeachment trial in
American history, that was Mr. Starr's cue not only to shut up but to stop any
activity by his office that would direct attention away from the Senate or reduce its
bargaining room.
Id. Instead of acknowledging that the condemned distraction flowed not from Mr. Starr's
deliberative activity, but rather from the reporting of it on the front page of the New York
Times, the Times addressed its own role simply by stating that "[t]he issue of who leaked
news of Mr. Starr's indictment research to The New York Times is a phony one. What is
needed here is not an investigation ofjournalistic sources, but attention to the substance
of Mr. Starr's legal mischief. It seems designed to disrupt these solemn deliberations into
Presidential misconduct of a serious if undeniably sordid kind." Id.
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4. Consideration of the Impact on Individuals Threatened with Jail
Time.-The final layer of considerations raised by Mr. Bakaly's case
concerns the very specific question of reporters' interaction with-
and perhaps responsibilities to-their leaking sources (or those al-
leged to be the leaking sources). Journalists might well say that they
cannot be taxed with worrying about the issues discussed above-the
general systemic consequences of leaks on the administration of jus-
tice, the results of the leak-and-spin dynamic witnessed in high-profile
cases, or governmental decisions about whether alleged leakers
should be sanctioned. Yet they may be troubled by the effects that a
particular decision to obtain and publish information will have on in-
dividuals-especially where a source or a non-source is threatened
with jail time as a result of a reporter's judgment.
Those subject to Rule 6(e) and bound by professional and ethical
obligations may not share much investigatory information. Yet report-
ers may, in most situations, freely obtain and publish it. Absent break-
ing and entering or other obviously illegal means of access,177
reporters may quite legally receive internal investigative information
that is not grand jury material. Further, as noted, Rule 6(e) does not
preclude the recipients of grand jury information from using it.1 78 Al-
though individuals not affiliated with the press have been pursued
criminally under a variety of theories, including obstruction ofjustice,
for improperly sharing or soliciting the sharing of grand jury materi-
als, 1 79 I have been unable to find a reported case in which reporters
have been pursued criminally for inducing persons covered by Rule
177. See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 691 (1972) (plurality opinion) (stating that
"[i]t would be frivolous to assert-and no one does in these cases-that the First Amend-
ment, in the interest of securing news or otherwise, confers a license on either the reporter
or his news sources to violate valid criminal laws" and that "[a] lthough stealing documents
or private wiretapping could provide newsworthy information, neither reporter nor source
is immune from conviction for such conduct, whatever the impact on the flow of news.").
178. See supra note 147 and accompanying text.
179. See, e.g., United States v. Brenson, 104 F.3d 1267, 1272 (11th Cir. 1997) (affirming
defendant grand juror's conviction for conspiracy and obstruction of justice based on his
disclosure of grand jury information to the investigation's target); United States v. Saget,
991 F.2d 702, 713 (11th Cir. 1993) (affirming convictions of two investigatory targets for
obstruction ofjustice where the targets, when approached by a grand juror, "actively solic-
ited information relating to the grand jury proceedings"); United States v. Jeter, 775 F.2d
670, 683 (6th Cir. 1985) (affirming convictions for conspiracy, obstruction of justice, and
theft of government property of a defendant (who was not bound by Rule 6(e)(2)) for
illicitly obtaining and distributing grand jury information); United States v. Howard, 569
F.2d 1331, 1337 (5th Cir. 1978) (affirming the convictions of persons (apparently only one
of whom was a court reporter covered by Rule 6(e) (2)) for obstruction based on a scheme
to sell grand jury transcripts to targets of an investigation); United States v. Friedman, 445
F.2d 1076, 1078 (9th Cir. 1971) (affirming convictions of defendants (some of whom were
not constrained by Rule 6(e) (2)) for conspiracy, contempt, receiving and concealing sto-
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6(e) to disclose materials covered by that rule. Why may reporters do
without fear that which others may not?
Although I have found no definitive explanation, one could posit
many. First Amendment interests spring immediately to mind. Also,
as a legal matter, prosecutors will likely conclude that, whereas investi-
gatory targets' "need to know" can be deemed a "corrupt" attempt to
obstruct justice if it causes an invasion of grand jury secrecy, the pub-
lic's "need to know" means that reporters do not have a "corrupt"
intent in following a story into the grand jury room. It may also be
that participants in the criminal justice system should be charged with
a special obligation to adhere to its rules and further its interests.
Congress and individual prosecutors may be reluctant to expend re-
sources pursuing leaks beyond those persons chargeable with this spe-
cial obligation. They may also be reluctant to antagonize a powerful
press. Whatever the rationale, the fact remains that while we con-
demn those who leak, we reward those who scoop.
Should the privilege that reporters enjoy to induce-with proba-
ble impunity-others to breach their ethical, professional, or legal ob-
ligations create a responsibility to those others? When a reporter can
clear up allegations that the source lied in the course of a leaks investi-
gation, what obligation, if any, does the reporter or the news organiza-
tion have to the source or to the justice system generally? In
particular, the "reporter's privilege" is said to be held by the reporter,
not the source.18 ° Although this appears to be the law, does this make
sense? If the source waives the protection of the privilege, what legiti-
mate reason(s) may the press posit for continued silence?
Many would no doubt argue that leakers leak for their own pur-
poses. They seek to use the press at their peril, and the press owes
them nothing but accuracy and whatever protection the "reporter's
privilege" offers in the circumstances. Although reporters offer their
sources anonymity, they are not responsible for their sources' lies-
even if reporters may recognize that the two often go hand in hand.
As a public policy matter, the "reporter's privilege" is founded on the
len government property, and obstruction of justice for a scheme to sell grand jury
transcripts).
180. See Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 695 (stating that "the privilege claimed is that of the
reporter, not the informant, and ... if the authorities independently identify the inform-
ant, neither his own reluctance to testify nor the objection of the newsman would shield
him from grand jury inquiry, whatever the impact on the flow of news or on his future
usefulness as a secret source of information"); United States v. Cuthbertson, 630 F.2d 139,
147 (3d Cir. 1980) (finding that waivers obtained by the Government from its witnesses
were not effective to remove the privilege because "[t]he privilege belongs to [the news
organization], not the potential witnesses, and it may be waived only by its holder").
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need to avoid deterring informants from providing information to the
press18 1 and rendering the press an "investigative arm of the govern-
ment. ' 18 2 The privilege is not intended to protect leakers from the
consequences of their actions. Even where a leaker wishes to waive
the privilege, rather than to hide behind it, many reporters would ar-
gue that she should not have that prerogative. She entered into a deal
with the reporter and should have understood that that deal included
absolute protection of the source by the reporter-regardless of
whether that protection is convenient to the source. Further, if the
person seeking vindication is not a source, the reporter owes that per-
son nothing. Finally, the press has an institutional interest in resisting
source-initiated waivers. A reporter may piece a story together using
multiple sources. If one source wishes to waive the privilege's protec-
tions to demonstrate that she was not the source of a given leak, it may
imperil the anonymity of the other sources. Still and still, where an
individual may go to prison because a reporter wishes to rely on the
privilege, do these arguments sound empty?
Let us examine in particular one of the counts brought against
Mr. Bakaly in which he was charged with lying about a statement he
attributed to Mr. Van Natta. Specifically, the Government charged
that Mr. Bakaly lied when he stated in his declaration that "'Mr. Van
Natta again assured me that he was "working on his sourcing" and that
he intended to make it clear in his article that his sources were not
within the 01C.""s8 In adjudicating whether this was a false state-
ment, whose testimony-aside from Mr. Bakaly's own-could be more
central than Mr. Van Natta's? The Times has apparently taken the po-
sition that it will not discuss the sources for the article. 184 To my
knowledge, Mr. Van Natta has not volunteered his view of the accu-
racy of this representation. In cataloguing the ironies of the Bakaly
case, one should add the possibility that the information that could
181. See, e.g., Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 693 (recounting the argument that "[tihe available
data indicate that some newsmen rely a great deal on confidential sources and that some
informants are particularly sensitive to the threat of exposure and may be silenced if it is
held by this Court that, ordinarily, newsmen must testify pursuant to subpoenas").
182. See, e.g., id at 708-09 (Powell, J., concurring).
183. Amended Notice, supra note 41, 12(c), at 7 (quoting Bakaly Declaration, supra
note 16, 11, at 4). As discussed supra note 46, the Government also charged that Mr.
Bakaly's actions caused the following false statement to be included in the OIC brief: "'Mr.
Van Natta further told Mr. Bakaly that all his information came from sources "outside" the
OIC.'" Id. 13, at 8 (quoting Opposition Brief, supra note 20, at 13). This count raises
similar issues.
184. See Adam Clymer, Justice Dept. Details Its Case Against Former Starr Spokesman, N.Y.
TIMES, July 11, 2000, at A16 ("Editors at the Times have said they do not and will not discuss
the sources for the article.").
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vindicate Mr. Bakaly lies in the hands of the press, and it is guarding
the truth as zealously as any FOIA officer, grand juror, or Pentagon
official. Just as those guardians do, the press presumably cites an over-
riding public interest in support of its silence-the important reasons
for recognition of a "reporter's privilege." But just as the press is wont
to do, it is appropriate to question whether this silence is merely con-
venient, and whether it is consonant with other values.
The fundamental question is this: what obligation, if any, do Mr.
Van Natta and the Times have to Mr. Bakaly? As a preliminary matter,
one could argue that the parties, if they deemed Mr. Van Natta's testi-
mony sufficiently important, could have subpoenaed him and (absent
Mr. Van Natta's willingness to be jailed for contempt) secured his tes-
timony even over a claim of privilege. In particular, from an idealistic,
but not very practical perspective, one could contend that the Govern-
ment, which is supposed to be serving justice and not merely seeking a
conviction, should have pursued Mr. Van Natta's testimony regardless
of whether it would inculpate or exculpate Mr. Bakaly. Presumably
the parties did not subpoena Mr. Van Natta because they did not
know what he would say. Without the chance to debrief him in ad-
vance of his taking the stand, neither party was willing to ask him to
try on the bloody glove at trial. It may also be that even if Mr. Bakaly's
counsel felt fairly confident of what Mr. Van Natta's answer should
have been, they were still unwilling to call him because of the possibili-
ties that Mr. Van Natta or Mr. Bakaly honestly disagreed or one misre-
membered the conversation at issue. In short, sound lawyering
precluded calling Mr. Van Natta to the stand without an opportunity
to talk to him beforehand-an opportunity that apparently was not
volunteered. Should it have been?
One may wish to break the question down further and ask if the
existence of an obligation depends upon whether Mr. Bakaly is inno-
cent or guilty of knowingly making a false statement. Let us begin
with the assumption that Mr. Bakaly's statement regarding his conver-
sation with Mr. Van Natta was false. Should the New York Times and
Mr. Van Natta come forward to provide the Government with that
information?
To ask the question is probably to answer it. In general, witnesses
have no legal obligation to volunteer evidence.1 8 In addition, these
185. "[A]greements to conceal information relevant to commission of crime have very
little to recommend them from the standpoint of public policy." Branzburg, 408 U.S. at
696. However, the criminal provision used to address this public policy concern-mis-
prison of a felony, see 18 U.S.C. § 4 (1994)-requires proof of more than a simple failure to
volunteer relevant information. To prove misprison, the Government must demonstrate
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witnesses have a weighty interest in not providing such evidence. Pre-
sumably in this circumstance, were the New York Times or Mr. Van
Natta to volunteer their story, their public-spiritedness would impair
their future effectiveness. That is, if sources were to understand that
the press would stand as volunteer witnesses against them if they lie
about leaking, they may well not leak in the first instance. In other
words, it is very much in the press's interest to avoid assisting the par-
ties in arriving at the truth where the leaker is a liar.
What of the public interest here? The press would rightfully
claim that it cannot effectively do the prosecutor's job and its own.
The public interest in a conviction must be vindicated by the Govern-
ment and the Government alone so that the press can pursue the pub-
lic interest in news-gathering and reporting.
Does the result differ in the more distressing circumstance that
the person on trial is, in fact, telling the truth? Assume that Mr.
Bakaly accurately recounted the conversation in question. Once
again, the press may argue that it has no obligation to volunteer infor-
mation and that the obligation to ensure a just result rests with the
Government, not with the press. These assertions have a decidedly
less appealing ring when an individual's liberty is at stake.
Of course, the extent of a reporter's ethical dilemma in this cir-
cumstance depends to some extent on the facts. For example, if Mr.
Bakaly is accurately remembering the conversation at issue, the extent
of Mr. Van Natta's testimony on the subject could be brief; he could
simply state that he did in fact say the things Mr. Bakaly attributed to
him. The corresponding incursion on the principles underlying the
"reporter's privilege" would be limited. It would seem, then, that this
is the strongest case for a volunteered exoneration because it is diffi-
cult to imagine how a reporter's willingness to vindicate his source's
recollection of a specific conversation would create a disincentive for
future leakers.
The consequences of a decision to permit an innocent source to
waive the privilege may not always be so limited or containable. For
that "(1) the principal committed and completed the felony alleged...; (2) the defendant
had full knowledge of that fact; (3) the defendant failed to notify the authorities; and (4)
the defendant took an affirmative step to conceal the crime." United States v. Ciambrone,
750 F.2d 1416, 1417 (9th Cir. 1985). " ' Mere silence, without some affirmative act, is insuf-
ficient evidence' of the crime of misprison of felony. Thus, a person who witnesses a crime
does not violate 18 U.S.C. § 4 if he simply remains silent." Id. at 1418 (citation omitted); see
also United States v. Adams, 961 F.2d 505, 508-09 (5th Cir. 1992) ("[U]nder the misprison
statute, the defendant must commit an affirmative act to prevent discovery of the earlier
felony. '[M]ere failure to make known does not suffice.'" (alteration in original) (quoting
United States v. Warters, 885 F.2d 1266, 1275 (5th Cir. 1989))).
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example, suppose the issue was whether a defendant had lied to inves-
tigators in denying that he was the source of a particular leak. By
volunteering to exonerate the falsely accused leaker, the reporter may
well threaten her actual source-either by narrowing the list of poten-
tial candidates or by testifying (obviously under duress) to the name
of the real leaker. Thus, by vindicating the defendant and serving
justice, the reporter may, in individual cases, disserve the ultimate in-
terests of her vocation. Similarly, suppose that the case concerned
one alleged false statement in a leaks investigation and that the re-
porter, in fact, pieced the story together using a number of unnamed
sources. It is conceivable that the reporter may be forced to discuss all
of her sources in order to vindicate the one, thus more seriously im-
pairing the credibility of future assurances of anonymity.
In evaluating these issues, the systemic consequences of individ-
ual decisions cannot be ignored. News organizations may well argue
that they cannot take case-specific positions based on the innocence
or guilt of the particular party accused for fear of prejudicing the next
informant in the next case. Thus, for example, if the media were to
take the position that it would waive the privilege in order to exoner-
ate those who have been unfairly charged, what would it be implicitly
communicating when it refuses to waive? Would such refusals be
deemed tacit admissions that the leaker did, in fact, lie? Although it
may be difficult to swallow in individual cases, news organizations may
contend that in order to protect the guilty-and thus safeguard the
press's interest in encouraging future leakers-the reporter must sac-
rifice the innocent.
Were a court to address the question, it likely would conclude
that the defendant's and the criminal justice system's interests are par-
amount. If evaluated solely as a matter of what best serves the press's
news-gathering interests, it would seem that silence is the appropriate
course. In my informal poll of journalists, I have discovered an inter-
esting range of opinions. For example, one reporter indicated that
silence in this context would present no ethical dilemma for many
journalists. Another opined that where the actual source would not
be threatened, it would be the right thing to do to seek, in consulta-
tion with the source and probably counsel for the news organization,
to prevent a miscarriage of justice.
CONCLUSION
My apologies to those readers who will be frustrated by my unwill-
ingness to stake out an unequivocal position on this issue. I have not
attempted to resolve this dilemma-or many of the other questions
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posited in this Article-because I am not sure that there are hard and
fast answers. I hope, however, that the above discussion provides
some fodder for conversation about issues that I believe to be impor-
tant legacies of the Clinton scandals.
